Initializing a local key manager for providing secure data transfer in a computing environment

ABSTRACT

Aspects of the invention include initializing a local key manager (LKM) on a node of a computing environment. The node includes a plurality of channels. The LKM is configured to provide a secure data transfer between the node and an other node of the computing environment. A connection is established, by the LKM, between the LKM and an external key manager (EKM) that stores a shared key for the node and the other node. In response to establishing the connection, the LKM registers security capabilities of the plurality of channels. The security capabilities are used by the LKM to provide the secure data transfer between the node and the other node.

BACKGROUND

The present invention generally relates to providing security withincomputing environments, and in particular, to local key manager (LKM)initialization and host bus adapter (HBA) security registration at anode of a computing environment.

Encryption provides data security for data and/or other informationbeing transmitted between two entities, such as a source node and atarget node coupled via a plurality of endpoints or links. Tostandardize aspects of encryption, various standards are provided fordifferent types of communication protocols. For instance, the FC-SP-2and FC-LS-3 standards are provided for Fibre Channels.

The FC-SP-2 standard, as an example, used for encrypting Fibre Channellinks includes protocols for mutual authentication of two endpoints, aswell as protocols for negotiating encryption keys that are used incommunication sessions between the two endpoints. The standard providessupport for a variety of mechanisms to authenticate the involvedparties, as well as mechanisms by which key material is provided ordeveloped. The standard is defined for several authenticationinfrastructures, including secret-based, certificate-based,password-based, and pre-shared key based, as examples.

Generally, a certificate-based infrastructure is considered to provide astrong form of secure authentication, as the identity of an endpoint iscertified by a trusted certificate authority. The FC-SP-2 standarddefines a mechanism by which multiple certified entities can use thepublic-private key pairs that the certificate binds them to in order toauthenticate with each other. This authentication occurs directlybetween two entities through the use of the Fibre Channel Authenticationprotocol (FCAP), the design of which is based on authentication thatuses certificates and signatures as defined in, for instance, theInternet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol.

However, the exchange and validation of certificates inline is computeintensive, as well as time-consuming. The FCAP protocol is alsoperformed on every Fibre Channel link between the entities. Since it isto be done before any client traffic flows on the links that are to beintegrity and/or security protected, it can negatively impact (elongate)the link initialization times, and hence, the time it takes to bring upand begin executing client workloads. The IKE protocol also involvesfairly central processing unit intensive mathematical computations, andin an environment that includes large enterprise servers with a largenumber of Fibre Channel physical ports in a dynamic switched fabricconnected to a large number of storage controller ports, the multipliereffect of these computations and the high volume of frame exchanges tocomplete the IKE protocol can also negatively affect systeminitialization and cause constraints in heavy normal operation.

SUMMARY

Embodiments of the present invention are directed to local key manager(LKM) initialization and host bus adapter (HBA) security registration ata node of a computing environment. A non-limiting examplecomputer-implemented method includes initializing a LKM on the node. Thenode includes a plurality of channels. The LKM is configured to providea secure data transfer between the node and an other node of thecomputing environment. A connection is established, by the LKM, betweenthe LKM and an external key manager (EKM) that stores a shared key forthe node and the other node. In response to establishing the connection,the LKM registers security capabilities of the plurality of channels.The security capabilities are used by the LKM to provide the secure datatransfer between the node and the other node.

Other embodiments of the present invention implement features of theabove-described method in computer systems and computer programproducts.

Additional technical features and benefits are realized through thetechniques of the present invention. Embodiments and aspects of theinvention are described in detail herein and are considered a part ofthe claimed subject matter. For a better understanding, refer to thedetailed description and to the drawings.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The specifics of the exclusive rights described herein are particularlypointed out and distinctly claimed in the claims at the conclusion ofthe specification. The foregoing and other features and advantages ofthe embodiments of the invention are apparent from the followingdetailed description taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawingsin which:

FIG. 1 depicts an example of a computing environment to incorporate anduse one or more embodiments of the present invention;

FIG. 2A depicts an example of a host of the computing environment ofFIG. 1 to incorporate and/or use one or more embodiments of the presentinvention;

FIG. 2B depicts another example of a host of the computing environmentof FIG. 1 to incorporate and/or use one or more embodiments of thepresent invention;

FIG. 3 depicts a block diagram of a computing environment for local keymanager (LKM) initialization and host bus adapter (HBA) securityregistration according to one or more embodiments of the presentinvention;

FIG. 4 depicts a process for LKM initialization and HBA securityregistration according to one or more embodiments of the presentinvention;

FIG. 5 depicts a block diagram of a computing environment for generatinga secure key exchange (SKE) initialization request according to one ormore embodiments of the present invention;

FIG. 6 depicts a process for generating an SKE security association (SA)initialization request according to one or more embodiments of thepresent invention;

FIG. 7 depicts a block diagram of a computing environment for SKE SAprocessing and message generation at a node of a target channelaccording to one or more embodiments of the present invention;

FIG. 8 depicts a process for SKE SA initialization processing andmessage generation at a node of a target channel according to one ormore embodiments of the present invention;

FIG. 9 depicts a block diagram of a computing environment for generatingan SKE authentication request based on an SKE SA initialization responseaccording to one or more embodiments of the present invention;

FIG. 10 depicts a process for generating an SKE authentication requestbased on an SKE SA initialization response according to one or moreembodiments of the present invention;

FIG. 11 depicts a block diagram of a computing environment for SKEauthentication message processing according to one or more embodimentsof the present invention;

FIG. 12 depicts a process for SKE authentication message processingaccording to one or more other embodiments of the present invention;

FIG. 13 depicts a block diagram of a computing environment for HBA keyloading based on SKE authentication according to one or more embodimentsof the present invention;

FIG. 14 depicts a process for HBA key loading based on SKEauthentication according to one or more embodiments of the presentinvention;

FIG. 15 depicts a process for refreshing keys in a computing environmentthat uses SKE to provide secure data transfer according to one or moreembodiments of the present invention;

FIG. 16A depicts another example of a computing environment toincorporate and use one or more aspects of the present invention;

FIG. 16B depicts further details of the memory of FIG. 16A;

FIG. 17 depicts a cloud computing environment according to one or moreembodiments of the present invention; and

FIG. 18 depicts abstraction model layers according to one or moreembodiments of the present invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

In accordance with one or more embodiments of the present invention, asdata is being moved within and across data centers, authentication ofthe identities exchanging data and encryption of the data are used tostrengthen security of the data. In one example, Fibre Channel EndpointSecurity (FCES), offered by International Business Machines Corporation,Armonk, N.Y. is used to encrypt data in flight using the Fibre Channeland Fibre Connection (FICON) protocols. FCES helps to ensure theintegrity and confidentiality of all data flowing on Fibre Channel linksbetween authorized hosts and storage devices, by creating a trustedstorage network that encrypts data in flight. In one or more embodimentsof the present invention, security levels are negotiated and establishedbetween the host and storage devices using secure key exchange (SKE)messaging. As part of this process, SKE request and response messagesare generated and processed to ensure that the correct level of securityis used by the end points (i.e., the hosts and the storage devices).

As used herein the term “secure key exchange” or “SKE” refers to aprotocol used to create a security association (SA) between twoendpoints, or nodes, in a network. One of more embodiments of the SKEprotocol described herein build upon the Internet Key Exchange (IKE)protocol. In accordance with one or more embodiments of the presentinvention, a local key manager (LKM) executing on each node connects toa security key lifecycle manager, which is used to create shared secretmessages to which only the parties involved have access. In accordancewith one or more embodiments of the present invention, the LKM acts as aclient of the security key lifecycle manager, issuing key managementinteroperability protocol (KMIP) requests to create keys. One or moreembodiments of the SKE protocol involve the exchange of four messages.The first two messages referred to as “SKE SA Init Request” (alsoreferred to herein as a “SKE SA initialization request”) and “SKE SAInit Response” (also referred to herein as a “SKE SA initializationresponse”) are unencrypted messages that exchange parameters which areused to derive a set of cryptographic keys. The final two messagesreferred to as “SKE Auth Request” (also referred to herein as an “SKEauthentication request”) and “SKE Auth Response” (also referred toherein as an “SKE authentication response”) are encrypted messages thatestablish the authenticity of each endpoint, or node, as well asidentify which encryption algorithm will be used to secure thecommunication between the endpoints. In a Fibre Channel environment, theSKE messages can be encapsulated, for example, in AUTH extended linkservice requests (AUTH ELS) in a format defined by the FC-SP-2 standard.

One or more embodiments of the present invention provide host busadapter (HBA) security registration with an LKM for SKE messageprocessing to allow secure data to be sent between computing nodes (orbetween channels on the same computing node) in a computing environment.In accordance with one or more embodiments of the present invention, theLKM, which manages private security keys for the HBAs on a computingnode, is initialized on the computing node. The LKM establishes aconnection with an external key manager (EKM) remote from the computingnode. In addition, the HBAs on the computing node executing the LKM areregistered with the LKM. The registration of the HBAs with the LKMallows channels of the HBAs to properly process SKE messages sent to orreceived from the computing node. Once LKM initialization is complete,the LKM is aware of the security capabilities of the HBAs. The LKM usesthis information to build and manage the security of data requestsbetween the computing node and other computing nodes in the computingenvironment.

One or more embodiments of the present invention provide generation ofan SKE SA initialization request, or SKE SA Init Request, to providesecurity for data transfers between channels in a computing environment.The SKE SA initialization request processing is performed subsequent toLKM initialization and registration of the HBAs on the computing nodethat is generating the SKE SA initialization request. The SKE SAinitialization request can be generated by an LKM executing on thecomputing node in response to receiving a request from a HBA (alsoreferred to herein as a “channel”) of the computing node to communicate(e.g., send data to) another channel. The other channel can be locatedon the same node to provide the ability to securely pass data betweentwo different partitions executing on the node. The other channel canalso be located on a different computing node to provide the ability tosecurely pass data between channels located on different computingnodes.

The node with the channel that is initiating the request to communicatewith another channel is referred to herein as the “initiator” or“source” node; and the node that contains the other channel that is thetarget of the request is referred to herein as the “responder” or“target” node. Upon receiving the request from the HBA, or channel, tocommunicate with a channel on a target node, the LKM on the source nodecreates an SA and then sends a request message (referred to herein as an“SKE SA initialization request message”) to the channel on the targetnode via the requesting channel. In accordance with one or moreembodiments of the present invention, the SKE SA initialization requestmessage includes a shared key identifier) provided by the EKM) thatidentifies a shared key that is to provide secure communication betweenthe source node and the target node. A shared key rekey timer can be setby the LKM to limit the lifespan of the shared key based on a systempolicy. In addition to the shared key, the SKE SA initialization requestmessage includes a nonce and a security parameter index (SPI) of theinitiator channel that are used to derive keys for encrypting anddecrypting payloads (e.g., data) sent between the nodes.

As used herein, the term “node” or “computing node” refers to but is notlimited to: a host computer and a storage array. A storage array can beimplemented, for example, by a control unit and/or a storage controller.A host computer, or host, can be implemented, for example, by aprocessor, a computer system, and/or a central electronics complex(CEC). As used herein, the term “computing environment” refers to agroup of nodes that are coupled together to perform all or a subset ofthe processing described herein. For FICON channel to channel (CTC)connections, each of the ports, or channels, can be both initiators andresponders. In contrast to FICON channels, Fibre Channel protocol (FCP)storage channels on a host are always the source, or initiator; and thecontrol unit, or storage array, is always the target, or responder.

One or more embodiments of the present invention provide SKE SAinitialization processing and message generation at a node of a targetchannel. The processing and generation of an SKE SA Init Responsemessage is performed in response to the target channel receiving an SKESA Init Request from a source channel. The processing at the responder,or target, node includes the LKM obtaining the shared key (if needed),and transmitting a nonce generated by the LKM and an SPI describing thetarget channel to the channel on the initiator node via an SKE SA InitResponse message. When the processing associated with the SKE SA InitRequest and SKE SA Init Response messages is completed, the initiatorand the responder nodes have the shared key information that they needto transmit encrypted messages between them and to decrypt the messagesthat they receive.

One or more embodiments of the present invention provide SKE SAinitialization response message processing and SKE Auth Request messagegeneration at a node of a source channel. The processing and generationof an SKE Auth Request message are performed in response to the sourcechannel receiving an SKE SA Init Response from a target channel. Theprocessing at the initiator, or source, node can include SKE SA InitResponse message verification and device group checking based on the SA.The LKM of the source node can generate session keys and build an SKEAuth Request message. The source node transmits the SKE Auth Requestmessage to the target node.

One or more embodiments of the present invention provide SKE AuthRequest message processing and SKE Auth Response message generation at anode of a target channel. The processing and generation of an SKE AuthResponse message are performed in response to the target channelreceiving an SKE Auth Request from a source channel. The processing atthe responder, or target, node can include SKE Auth Request messageverification and device group checking based on the SA. The LKM of thetarget node can decrypt the SKE Auth Request message, verify aninitiator signature, generate a responder signature, select anencryption algorithm, and build an SKE Auth Response message. The targetnode transmits the SKE Auth Response message to the source node.

One or more embodiments of the present invention provide SKE AuthResponse message processing and HBA key loading at a node of a targetchannel. The processing and HBA key loading are performed in response tothe source channel receiving an SKE Auth Response from a target channel.The processing at the initiator, or source, node can include SKE AuthResponse message verification and device group checking based on the SA.The LKM of the source node can decrypt the SKE Auth Response message,verify the responder signature, select an encryption algorithm, and loadone or more HBA keys at the source channel to support using the selectedencryption algorithm in future communication with the target channel.Upon notifying the LKM of the source node that authentication is done, asession key rekey timer can be started to initiate a session key rekeyprocess based on a system policy.

One or more embodiments of the present invention provide a process forrefreshing, or rekeying, the shared key(s) and the session key(s). Asdescribed previously, a shared key rekey timer can be set to limit theamount of time that a shared key can be used. When the shared key rekeytimer expires, a process to generate a new shared key is initiated.Also, as described previously, a session key rekey timer can be set tolimit the amount of time that a session key can be used. When thesession key rekey timer expires, an SKE SA Init Request message isgenerated to initiate the derivation of a new set of cryptographic keysfor use in communication between the source and target nodes.

Authentication, via the EKM, between the trusted nodes that sharemultiple links is performed once, instead of on a link by link basis.The ability of both entities to receive a shared key (e.g., a symmetrickey) as trusted entities of the EKM and to use it to encrypt/decryptmessages between them proves mutual authentication. Further, securecommunication across all links (or selected links) connecting them isprovided without additional accesses to the EKM. Instead, the previouslyobtained shared key is used in communications between the trusted nodeson other links, or channels, coupling the nodes providing authenticationof the links, without having to re-authenticate the trusted nodes viathe EKM.

In accordance with one or more embodiments described herein, a trustednode initiates and activates an LKM executing on the trusted node tomanage security between HBAs. The HBAs register their securitycapabilities and address information with the LKM in order to allowchannels on the HBA to process SKE messages. SKE SA initializationrequest messages can be built based on an HBA channel on a trusted noderequesting SKE SA initialization between itself (an initiator node) anda target, or responder node. The LKM manages the identification oractivation of a device group key identifier for the two trusted nodesthat is used to build the SKE SA initialization request. The LKM on theinitiator node and the LKM on the responder node trade information viaSKE SA initialization request and response messages. The tradedinformation is used to encrypt and decrypt data sent between thechannels on the respective nodes. The SKE SA initialization request andresponse messages can be exchanged in an unencrypted format, and SKEauthentication request and response messages can be sent in an encryptedformat. The SKE authentication request messages can include a proposallist of encryption algorithms to be used for data exchanged between thenodes, and the SKE authentication response messages can confirm whichproposal was accepted by the responder node as a selected encryptionalgorithm. The responder node can also notify the initiator node when tobegin data transfers using the selected encryption algorithm, which canbe a different encryption format than the encryption used to send theSKE authentication request and response messages. Both the shared keyand the session key(s) can be refreshed, or rekeyed, based onprogrammable timers expiring.

One example of a computing environment 100 to include one or moreaspects of the present invention is described with reference to FIG. 1.In the example shown in FIG. 1, the computing environment includes atleast one node (e.g., host 102) and at least one other node (e.g.,storage array 110) coupled together via a storage area network (SAN)108. The host 102 can include a central processing unit and memory andbe implemented by a system such as, but not limited to a System zoffered by International Business Machines Corporation. The host 102shown in FIG. 1 includes an LKM 104 and one or more HBAs 106. Inaccordance with one or more embodiments of the present invention, theLKM 104 is a component that manages the private keys for the HBAs 106,and each of the HBAs 106 provide an input/output (I/O) interface thattransmits and encrypts data. The storage array 110 can be implemented,for example, by a storage device, a direct access storage device (DASD),or a tape device. One example of a storage device that can be utilizedincludes DS8000 offered by International Business Machines Corporation.The storage array 110 shown in FIG. 1 includes an LKM 112 and one ormore HBAs 114. The SAN 108 can be implemented by a network of FICON andFibre Channel switches and directors. FICON is a known communicationpath for data between the host and the storage device utilizing FibreChannel technology.

The computing environment shown in FIG. 1 also includes one or moresupport elements (SE) 128 coupled to one of more hosts 102 via a servicenetwork 130. The SEs 128 are also coupled to a server hardwaremanagement console (HMC) 124 via a private network 126. The servicenetwork 130 in an internal server network that is used by the SEs 128 tocommunicate with each subsystem, or host 102 and can be implemented, forexample, by an Ethernet network or other known local area network (LAN).In the embodiment shown in FIG. 1, the private network 126 is used forSE 128 to server HMC 124 communication and can be implemented, forexample, by an Ethernet network or other known LAN. Each server HMC 124manages multiple hosts 102 and, as shown in FIG. 1, they can communicatewith the SEs 128 over the private network 126 using, for example, an SEcertificate. SE 128 can be implemented by a server and is used to managehardware that communicates to the LKM 104 in host 102 via the servicenetwork 130. In an embodiment, each SE 128 corresponds to one host 102and includes the instructions to initialize the corresponding host 102using an SE certificate. Having the SEs 128 communicate with the hosts102 via an internal network provides an additional level of protectionto the SE certificate. In accordance with one or more embodiments of thepresent invention, the host 102 is configured by a customer to utilizethe security features described herein.

As shown in FIG. 1, the server HMCs 124 are coupled to storage arrayHMCs 118 and EKM 122 via network 120. Each storage array HMC 118 can beused to manage multiple storage arrays 110 and, as shown in FIG. 1, theycan communicate with the storage arrays 110 via service network 116.Service network 116 can be implemented, for example, by an Ethernetnetwork or other known LAN. Network 120 can be implemented by anynetwork known in the art, such as, but not limited to a wide areanetwork (WAN) and a LAN. In accordance with one or more embodiments ofthe present invention, the EKM 122 is used to provide shared keys to thehost 102 and the storage array 110. It is trusted by the host 102 andthe storage array 110 via, for example, certificates installed on thehost 102, storage array 110, and EKM 122 at set-up, and signed by acertification authority (not shown).

The HBAs 106 in the host 102 and the HBAs 114 in the storage array 110shown in FIG. 1 communicate via SAN 108. The SAN 108 can include FibreChannel nodes that are connected via an optical cable where data isexchanged using an optical transceiver. The physical link specificationscan be defined, for example, by FC-PI. The Fibre Channel communicationcan encapsulate multiple higher-level protocols such as FICON, definedby FC-SB2, as well as Fibre Channel protocol for SCSI, defined by FCP-4.

It is to be understood that the block diagram of FIG. 1 is not intendedto indicate that the computing environment 100 is to include all of thecomponents shown in FIG. 1. Rather, the computing environment 100 caninclude any appropriate fewer or additional components not illustratedin FIG. 1, with some components shown in FIG. 1 combined or thefunctions performed by one or more components performed by different orseveral components. Further, the embodiments described herein withrespect to computing environment 100 may be implemented with anyappropriate logic, wherein the logic, as referred to herein, can includeany suitable hardware (e.g., a processor, an embedded controller, or anapplication specific integrated circuit, among others), software (e.g.,an application, among others), firmware, or any suitable combination ofhardware, software, and firmware, in various embodiments.

Although examples of protocols, communication paths and technologies areprovided herein, one or more aspects are applicable to other types ofprotocols, communication paths and/or technologies. Further, other typesof nodes may employ one or more aspects of the present invention.Additionally, a node may include fewer, more, and/or differentcomponents. Moreover, two nodes coupled to one another may be both thesame type of node or different types of nodes. As examples, both nodesare hosts, both nodes are storage arrays, or one node is a host andanother node is a storage array, as described in the examples herein.Many variations are possible.

As an example, a host may be a computing device, such as a processor, acomputer system, a central electronics complex (CEC), etc. One exampleof a computer system that may include and/or use one or more aspects ofthe present invention is depicted in FIG. 2A.

Referring to FIG. 2A, in one example, a computer system 200 is shown inthe form of a general-purpose computing device. Computer system 200includes and/or is coupled to a plurality of components, which are inaddition to and/or include the components shown in FIG. 1 including, butnot limited to, LKM 104, HBA 106, LKM 112, HBA 114, service network 130,and service network 116, which are part of and/or coupled to thecomputer system, but not explicitly indicated in FIG. 2A. In oneexample, computer system 200 includes, but is not limited to, one ormore processors or processing units 202 (e.g., central processing units(CPUs)), processing circuits, a memory 204 (a.k.a., system memory, mainmemory, main storage, central storage or storage, as examples), and oneor more input/output (I/O) interfaces 206, coupled to one another viaone or more buses and/or other connections 208.

Continuing with FIG. 2A, bus 208 represents one or more of any ofseveral types of bus structures, including a memory bus or memorycontroller, a peripheral bus, an accelerated graphics port, and aprocessor or local bus using any of a variety of bus architectures. Byway of example, and not limitation, such architectures include theIndustry Standard Architecture (ISA), the Micro Channel Architecture(MCA), the Enhanced ISA (EISA), the Video Electronics StandardsAssociation (VESA) local bus, and the Peripheral Component Interconnect(PCI).

Memory 204 may include, for instance, a cache, such as a shared cache210, which may be coupled to local caches 212 of processors 202.Further, memory 204 may include one or more programs or applications214, an operating system 216, and one or more computer readable programinstructions 218. Computer readable program instructions 218 may beconfigured to carry out functions of embodiments of aspects of theinvention.

Computer system 200 may also communicate via, e.g., I/O interfaces 206with one or more external devices 220, one or more network interfaces222, and/or one or more data storage devices 224. Example externaldevices include a user terminal, a tape drive, a pointing device, adisplay, etc. Network interface 222 enables computer system 200 tocommunicate with one or more networks, such as a local area network(LAN), a general wide area network (WAN), and/or a public network (e.g.,the Internet), providing communication with other computing devices orsystems.

Data storage device 224 may store one or more programs 226, one or morecomputer readable program instructions 228, and/or data, etc. Thecomputer readable program instructions may be configured to carry outfunctions of embodiments of aspects of the invention.

Computer system 200 may include and/or be coupled toremovable/non-removable, volatile/non-volatile computer system storagemedia. For example, it may include and/or be coupled to a non-removable,non-volatile magnetic media (typically called a “hard drive”), amagnetic disk drive for reading from and writing to a removable,non-volatile magnetic disk (e.g., a “floppy disk”), and/or an opticaldisk drive for reading from or writing to a removable, non-volatileoptical disk, such as a CD-ROM, DVD-ROM or other optical media. Itshould be understood that other hardware and/or software componentscould be used in conjunction with computer system 200. Examples,include, but are not limited to: microcode, device drivers, redundantprocessing units, external disk drive arrays, RAID systems, tape drives,and data archival storage systems, etc.

Computer system 200 may be operational with numerous other generalpurpose or special purpose computing system environments orconfigurations. Examples of well-known computing systems, environments,and/or configurations that may be suitable for use with computer system200 include, but are not limited to, personal computer (PC) systems,server computer systems, thin clients, thick clients, handheld or laptopdevices, multiprocessor systems, microprocessor-based systems, set topboxes, programmable consumer electronics, network PCs, minicomputersystems, mainframe computer systems, and distributed cloud computingenvironments that include any of the above systems or devices, and thelike.

As indicated above, a computer system is one example of a host that mayincorporate and/or use one or more aspects of the present invention.Another example of a host to incorporate and/or employ one or moreaspects of the present invention is a central electronics complex, anexample of which is depicted in FIG. 2B.

Referring to FIG. 2B, in one example, a central electronics complex(CEC) 250 includes and/or is coupled to a plurality of components, whichare in addition to and/or include the components shown in FIG. 1including, but not limited to, local key manager (LKM) 104, HBA 106, LKM112, HBA 114, service network 130, and service network 116, which arepart of and/or coupled to the central electronics complex, but notexplicitly indicated in FIG. 2B. In one example, CEC 250 includes, butis not limited to, a memory 254 (a.k.a., system memory, main memory,main storage, central storage, storage) coupled to one or moreprocessors (a.k.a., central processing units (CPUs)) 260, and to aninput/output subsystem 262.

In one example, memory 254 of central electronics complex 250 includes,for example, one or more logical partitions 264, a hypervisor 266 thatmanages the logical partitions, and processor firmware 268. One exampleof hypervisor 266 is the Processor Resource/System Manager (PRISM),offered by International Business Machines Corporation. As used herein,firmware includes, e.g., the microcode of the processor. It includes,for instance, the hardware-level instructions and/or data structuresused in implementation of higher level machine code. In one embodiment,it includes, for instance, proprietary code that is typically deliveredas microcode that includes trusted software or microcode specific to theunderlying hardware and controls operating system access to the systemhardware.

Each logical partition 264 is capable of functioning as a separatesystem. That is, each logical partition can be independently reset, runa guest operating system 270 such as z/OS, offered by InternationalBusiness Machines Corporation, or another operating system, and operatewith different programs 282. An operating system or application programrunning in a logical partition appears to have access to a full andcomplete system, but in reality, only a portion of it is available.

Memory 254 is coupled to processors (e.g., CPUs) 260, which are physicalprocessor resources that may be allocated to the logical partitions. Forinstance, a logical partition 264 includes one or more logicalprocessors, each of which represents all or a share of a physicalprocessor resource 260 that may be dynamically allocated to the logicalpartition.

Further, memory 254 is coupled to I/O subsystem 262. I/O subsystem 262may be a part of the central electronics complex or separate therefrom.It directs the flow of information between main storage 254 andinput/output control units 256 and input/output (I/O) devices 258coupled to the central electronics complex.

While various examples of hosts are described herein, other examples arealso possible. Further, a host may also be referred to herein as asource, a server, a node, or an endpoint node, as examples.Additionally, a storage device may be referred to herein as a target, anode, or an endpoint node, as examples. Example storage devices includestorage controllers or control units. Other examples are also possible.

Turning now to FIG. 3, a block diagram of a computing environment 300for LKM initialization and HBA security registration is generally shownin accordance with one or more embodiments of the present invention. Thecomponents shown in FIG. 3 include host 102, SAN 108, storage arrays110, service network 130, SE 128, private network 126, server HMC 124,network 120, and EKM 122 as described previously with respect to FIG. 1.The host 102 shown in FIG. 3 is implemented by a server that isexecuting several logical partitions, or partitions, including twopartitions running operating systems (O/Ss) 302 and one partitionexecuting the LKM 104. The host 102 shown in FIG. 3 includes ahypervisor 304 for managing the partitions, and an interface between thepartitions and an input/output (I/O) subsystem 306. The I/O subsystem306 as shown in FIG. 3 provides an interface to the HBAs 106.

In accordance with one or more embodiments of the present invention, LKMactivation and initiation is triggered by a customer (e.g., owner of thehost 102) requesting that security be applied to the host 102. This canoccur for example, by the customer applying a feature code that theypurchased by enabling the feature code in the SE 128 and rebooting theSE 128. Upon reboot, the SE 128 can trigger the host 102 to initialize apartition for executing the LKM 104. A reboot of the SE 128 is notrequired to activate and initiate the LKM, and in another example, theLKM is activated and initiated by enabling the feature code in the SE128 without rebooting the SE 128. The triggering event to activate andinitialize the LKM 104 is shown as “1” in FIG. 3. Once the LKM isactivated and initialized, the LKM 104 notifies the I/O subsystem 306that the initialization is complete. This notification event is shown as“2” in FIG. 3. As shown in FIG. 3, the notification is initiated by theLKM 104, which notifies the hypervisor 304, which in turn notifies theI/O subsystem 306 that LKM initialization is complete. In accordancewith one or more embodiments, LKM initialization is complete once theLKM 104 is executing on the host 102.

In accordance with one or more embodiments of the present invention,once LKM initialization is complete, the LKM 104 contacts the EKM 122 torequest a secure connection to the EKM 122. In accordance with one ormore embodiments of the present invention, the host 102 executing theLKM 104 is a trusted node that has been certified by a trustedcertificate authority. In accordance with one or more embodiments, thehost 102 has the Internet Protocol (IP) address or hostname of the EKMalong with host's signed certificate from the trusted certificateauthority. Contacting the EKM 122 to request connection is shown as “3”in FIG. 3. As shown in FIG. 3, the connection request spans severalcomponents connecting the LKM 104 to the EKM 122: hypervisor 304, I/Osubsystem 306, service network 130, service element 128, private network126, server HMC 124, and network 120. In accordance with one or moreembodiments of the present invention, the LKM 104 sends the request toestablish a connection with the EKM 122 to the hypervisor 304, whichsends the request to the I/O subsystem 306, which sends the request tothe SE 128 via service network 130. The SE 128 sends a request to theserver HMC 124 via private network 126 to open a proxy connection (e.g.,a transport layer security, or TLS, session) across network 120 to theEKM 122.

In accordance with one or more embodiments, a KMIP is used to requestthe connection from the EKM 122. The KMIP message can include thecertificate from the trusted certificate authority and a KMIP messagecan be returned from the EKM 122, shown as “4” in FIG. 3, with either anindication that a connection has been established or an indication thata connection has not been established. In accordance with one or moreembodiments, the secure connection to the EKM 122 can be established ifthe EKM 122 recognizes the certificate sent by the host 102 in theconnection request. In accordance with one or more embodiments, thesecure connection to the EKM 122 is not established due, for example, tonetwork connectivity issues, configuration issues, and/or the EKM 122not recognizing the certificate. TLS and KMIP are just examples, asother protocols and secure communications may be used.

Based on the connection between the LKM 104 and the EKM 122 beingestablished, the LKM 104 notifies the I/O subsystem 306, via thehypervisor 304, that the connection has been established. This is shownas “5” in FIG. 3. As shown as “6” in FIG. 3, the I/O subsystem 306notifies the HBAs 106 that the LKM 104 is ready to process SKE messages(i.e., ready to provide secure data transfer with other computingnodes). As shown as “7” in FIG. 3, the HBAs 106 register their securitycapabilities and address information with the LKM 104. Examples ofsecurity capabilities include but are not limited to: authentication ordifferent types of encryption. The address information can include butis not limited to: the Fibre Channel address assigned to the HBA.

It is to be understood that the block diagram of FIG. 3 is not intendedto indicate that the computing environment 300 is to include all of thecomponents shown in FIG. 3. Rather, the computing environment 300 caninclude any appropriate fewer or additional components not illustratedin FIG. 3, with some components shown in FIG. 3 combined or thefunctions performed by one or more components performed by different orseveral components. Further, the embodiments described herein withrespect to computing environment 300 may be implemented with anyappropriate logic, wherein the logic, as referred to herein, can includeany suitable hardware (e.g., a processor, an embedded controller, or anapplication specific integrated circuit, among others), software (e.g.,an application, among others), firmware, or any suitable combination ofhardware, software, and firmware, in various embodiments.

Turning now to FIG. 4, a process 400 for LKM initialization and HBAsecurity registration is generally shown in accordance with one or moreembodiments of the present invention. All or a portion of the processingshown in FIG. 4 can be implemented, for example, by LKM 104 of FIG. 1executing on host 102 of FIG. 1. At block 402, the LKM partition isactivated and initialized on a node, such as host 102 of FIG. 1.Processing continues at block 404 with the LKM notifying an I/Osubsystem on the node, such as I/O subsystem 306 of FIG. 3, that theinitialization of the LKM is complete. At block 406, the LKM initiatescontact with an EKM, such as EKM 122 of FIG. 1, to request a secureconnection. As described previously, this can be performed using a KMIPmessage containing the request and a TLS session. At block 408, it isdetermined whether the connection with the EKM can be established. Inaccordance with one or more embodiments, the determination is made basedon a message returned from the EKM is response to the request sent atblock 406.

As shown in the embodiment of the process 400 in FIG. 4, if theconnection with the EKM was not established, processing continues atblock 406 with attempting another connection. Processing continues atblock 410 if it is determined at block 408 that a connection with theEKM was established. At block 410, the LKM notifies the subsystem thatan EKM connection has been established and at block 412, the I/Osubsystem notifies the HBAs on the node executing the LKM, such as HBAs106 of FIG. 1, that the LKM is ready to process SKE messages. At block414, the HBAs on the node executing the LKM register their securitycapabilities with the LKM.

The process flow diagram of FIG. 4 is not intended to indicate that theoperations of the process 400 are to be executed in any particularorder, or that all of the operations of the process 400 are to beincluded in every case. Additionally, the process 400 can include anysuitable number of additional operations.

Turning now to FIG. 5, a block diagram of a computing environment 500for generating an SKE SA initialization request (also referred to hereinas an “SKE SA Init Request”) is generally shown in accordance with oneor more embodiments of the present invention. The computing environment500 shown in FIG. 5 includes two nodes: a host 502 and a storage array504 that are coupled to an EKM server 506 (also referred to herein as anEKM) via one or more connections 508. As an example, the one or moreconnections 508 are Ethernet connections protected with a TLS securecommunication. The one of more connections 508 can include all, asubset, or a superset of the elements shown in FIGS. 1 and 3. The EKMserver 506 includes computer instructions to perform the EKM processingdescribed herein. In the embodiment shown in FIG. 5, host 502, storagearray 504, and EKM server 506 are coupled to a certification authority(CA) 510 which is used to sign certificates installed on the host 502,the storage array 504, and the EKM sever 506 to establish trust betweenthem.

As shown in FIG. 5, the host 502 includes LKM 520 coupled to HBAs 518(e.g., Fibre Channel ports, or FICON channels, or other links) that areused to communicate with storage array 504 via, for example a SANnetwork such as SAN 108 of FIG. 1. Though not shown in FIG. 5, the host502 and storage array 504 can also include one or more Ethernet portsthat are coupled to the EKM server 506 via a connection 508. FICON is aknown communication path for data transfer between the host 502 and thestorage array 504, and Ethernet is a known local area network (LAN).Similarly, in the example, the storage array 504 includes LKM 528coupled to HBAs 522 (e.g., Fibre Channel ports, or FICON channels) thatare used to communicate with host 502.

As shown by arrow 512 of FIG. 5, the LKM 520 receives a request from anHBA 518 on host 502 to send data to an HBA 522 on storage array 504. Inresponse to receiving the request from the HBA 518, the LKM 520 on thehost 502 determines whether an SA already exists between the HBA 518 onthe host 502 (the “initiator node”) and the HBA 522 on the storage array504 (the “responder node”). In accordance with one or more embodimentsof the present invention, only one communication path at a time can beopen between the HBA 518 on host 502 and the HBA 522 on storage array504. Thus, if an SA currently exists, either a communication path isalready in process between these two channels or an error has occurred(e.g., the request from the HBA 518 on host 502 has an error and hasrequested the wrong target node and/or target channel). In either case,an error message is returned to the requesting HBA 518 and the requestrejected.

If an SA does not exist, then the LKM 520 on host 502 enters a statewhere it creates an SA between the HBA 518 on host 502 and the HBA 522on storage array 506. The LKM 520 on host 502 determines whether it hasa shared key and shared key identifier for the host 502/storage array504 pair. The shared key and shared key identifier may be stored, forexample, in volatile memory (e.g., cache memory) located on the host 502that is accessible by the LKM 520. If the LKM 520 does not locate ashared key for the host 502/storage array 504 pair, then it sends arequest, as shown by arrow 514 on FIG. 5, to the EKM server 506 toretrieve a shared key for the host 502/storage array 504 pair and set upa device group that includes the host 502/storage array 504 pair (if onedoesn't already exist) on the EKM server 506. In accordance with one ormore embodiments of the present invention, this is performed by amultiple step process where the LKM 520 first queries the EKM server 506to determine whether a device group exists for the host 502/storagearray 504 pair and upon determining that the device group doesn't exist,requesting the EKM server 506 to create one. Once it is determined thatthe device group exists for the host 502/storage array 504 pair, the LKM520 requests a shared key that corresponds to device group.

The host 502 and/or storage array 504 may be identified to the EKM bytheir respective world-wide node names (WWNN). In response to receivingthe request from the LKM 520, the EKM server 506 authenticates the LKMand, if required, creates a device group that includes the host502/storage array 504 pair. The EKM server 506 also generates a sharedkey (also referred to herein as a “shared secret key”) specific to thehost 502/storage array 504 pair for use in encrypting and decryptingmessages and data transferred between the host 502 and the storage array504. As shown by arrow 524 of FIG. 5, the EKM server 506 sends theshared key to the requesting LKM 520 on host 502.

The receiving of the shared key by the LKM 520 may be a multiple stepprocess. In accordance with one or more embodiments of the presentinvention, the LKM 520 first requests a shared key identifier from theEKM server 506 for a specified device group. The shared key identifieris a unique identifier that can be used by the EKM server 506 tolocate/determine the corresponding shared key. In response to receivingthe shared key identifier, the LKM 520 sends a second request thatincludes the shared key identifier to the EKM server 506 to request theshared key. The EKM server 506 responds by returning the shared key. Inaccordance with one or more embodiments of the present invention, thedevice group name is a concatenation of the WWNNs of the host 502 andthe storage array 504. In accordance with one or more embodiments of thepresent invention, upon receiving the shared key, the LKM 520 may starta shared key rekey timer that is used to limit that amount of time thatthe shared key may be used before a rekey, or refresh, is required. Theamount of time may be based on system policies such as, but not limitedto the confidential nature of the data being exchanged, other securityprotections in place in the computer environment, and/or a likelihood ofan unauthorized access attempt. In accordance with one or moreembodiments of the present invention, in addition or alternatively to anelapsed amount of time, the shared key rekey timer can expire based on anumber of data exchanges between the source node and the target node.The polices can be configured by a customer via a user interface on anHMC such as server HMC 124 or storage array HMC 118 of FIG. 1. When theshared key rekey timer expires, the LKM 520 initiates a process toobtain a new shared key from the EKM server 506 as described inreference to FIG. 15 below.

In response to the LKM 520 having or obtaining a valid shared key andshared key identifier, the LKM 520 generates an SKE SA Init Requestmessage that includes the shared key identifier as well as a nonce andsecurity parameter index (SPI) created by the LKM 520 for the securecommunication between the channels. The LKM 520 creates the nonce andSPI using a random number generator. A nonce is an arbitrary number thatcan be used just once in a cryptographic communication. An SPI is anidentification tag that is added to the clear text portion of anencrypted Fibre Channel data frame. The receiver of the frame may usethis field to validate the key material used to encrypt the datapayload. The SKE SA Init Request message is sent to the HBA 518, orchannel, that requested that data be sent to the HBA 522 on storagearray 504. This in shown by arrow 516 in FIG. 5. The requesting (orinitiator) HBA 518 sends the SKE SA Init Request message, via a SANnetwork for example, to the target HBA 522 on storage array 504 as shownby arrow 526 in FIG. 5. In accordance with one or more embodiments ofthe present invention, the SKE SA Init Request message is sent as cleartext (i.e., it is not encrypted).

It is to be understood that the block diagram of FIG. 5 is not intendedto indicate that the computing environment 500 is to include all of thecomponents shown in FIG. 5. Rather, the computing environment 500 caninclude any appropriate fewer or additional components not illustratedin FIG. 5, with some components shown in FIG. 5 combined or thefunctions performed by one or more components performed by different orseveral components. For example, there may be one or more additionalnodes (e.g., hosts and/or storage arrays). Further, the embodimentsdescribed herein with respect to computing environment 500 may beimplemented with any appropriate logic, wherein the logic, as referredto herein, can include any suitable hardware (e.g., a processor, anembedded controller, or an application specific integrated circuit,among others), software (e.g., an application, among others), firmware,or any suitable combination of hardware, software, and firmware, invarious embodiments.

Turning now to FIG. 6, a process 600 for generating an SKE SAinitialization request is generally shown in accordance with one or moreembodiments of the present invention. All or a portion of the process600 can be performed, for example by an LKM such as, LKM 520 of FIG. 5.The process 600 begins at block 602 with the LKM receiving a messagefrom a channel (initiator channel) requesting the initialization of asecure communication with another channel (responder channel). Forexample, the initiator channel can be HBA 106 of FIG. 1 and theresponder channel can be HBA 114 of FIG. 1. It is determined at block604 whether the initiator HBA has been registered with the LKM. If theinitiator HBA has not been registered with the LKM, processing continuesat block 608 with rejecting the request (e.g., because the LKM cannotdetermine the security capabilities of the initiator HBA).

If it is determined, at block 604, that the initiator HBA is registeredwith the LKM, processing continues at block 606. At block 606, it isdetermined whether an SA already exists between the initiator channeland the responder channel. If an SA already exists, then processingcontinues at block 608 with rejecting the request.

If it is determined, at block 606, that an SA does not already existbetween the initiator node and the responder node, then processingcontinues at block 610 with creating the SA. Once an SA state has beencreated at block 610 for the initiator channel/responder channel pair,processing continues at block 612 with determining whether a devicegroup key, or shared key, for the initiator node/responder node pairexists. If a shared key exists for the initiator node/responder nodepair, then processing continues at block 614 with using the existingshared key. At block 616, an SKE SA Init Request message is built by theLKM. In accordance with one or more embodiments, the SKE SA Init Requestmessage includes: an identifier of the shared key; and a nonce and SPIcreated by the LKM for the secure communication between the channels. Atblock 618, the SKE SA Init Request message is sent to the initiatorchannel. The initiator channel then sends the SKE SA Init Requestmessage to the responder channel on the responder node.

If it is determined at block 612 that a shared key does not exist forthe initiator node/responder node pair, then processing continues atblock 620. At block 620, it is determined whether a device group existsfor the initiator node/responder node pair. Determining whether thedevice group exists can include the LKM asking the EKM if a device groupexists for the initiator node/responder node pair, and the EKMresponding with an identifier of the corresponding shared key (a sharedkey identifier) if the device group does exist or responding with anerror message if it does not. If it is determined that the device groupdoes exist, processing continues at block 622 with creating the sharedkey for the initiator node/responder node pair and at block 624 theshared key is stored at the initiator node. The shared key can becreated by the EKM in response to a request from the LKM. In accordancewith one or more embodiments of the present invention, the shared keyand the shard key identifier are stored in volatile memory so that theshared key is not saved when the initiator node is powered off orrestarted. In accordance with one or more embodiments of the presentinvention, the shared key has a limited life span based for example on,but not limited to: a number of security associations that the sharedkey has been used for and/or an elapsed amount of time since the sharedkey was created. After the shared key is stored, processing continues atblock 616 with the LKM building the SKE SA Init Request message.

If it is determined at block 620 that a device group does not exist forthe initiator node/responder node pair, block 626 is performed and adevice group pair is created for the initiator node/requestor node pair.The device group and shared key can be created by the EKM in response toa single (or multiple) requests from the LKM. Once the device group iscreated, processing continues at block 622 with creating the shared keyfor the initiator node/requestor node pair.

The process flow diagram of FIG. 6 is not intended to indicate that theoperations of the process 600 are to be executed in any particularorder, or that all of the operations of the process 600 are to beincluded in every case. Additionally, the process 600 can include anysuitable number of additional operations.

Turning now to FIG. 7, a block diagram of a computing environment 700for SKE SA initialization processing and message generation at a node ofa target channel is generally shown in accordance with one or moreembodiments of the present invention. The computing environment 700shown in FIG. 7 is similar to the computing environment 500 shown inFIG. 5 with the addition of processing of the SKE SA Init Requestmessage at the storage array 504 of the target HBA 522.

As shown by arrow 526 of FIG. 7, the HBA 522 on storage array 504receives an SKE SA Init Request message from the HBA 518 on host 502. Inresponse to receiving the SKE SA Init Request message, the HBA 522 sendsthe SKE SA Init Request message to the LKM 528 located on the storagearray 504 (as shown in by arrow 708 of FIG. 7). In response to receivingthe message, the LKM 528 on the storage array 504 determines whether anSA already exists between the HBA 518 on host 502 and the HBA 522 onstorage array 504. If an SA already exists, an error message is returnedto the HBA 522 and the request is rejected.

If an SA does not exist, then the LKM 528 on storage array 504 enters astate where it creates an SA between the HBA 518 on host 502 and the HBA522 on storage array 506. The LKM 528 on storage array 504 determineswhether it has a shared key that corresponds to the shared keyidentifier contained in the SKE SA Init Request. The shared key and itscorresponding shared key identifier may be stored, for example, involatile memory (e.g., cache memory) located on the storage array 504that is accessible by the LKM 528. If the LKM 528 does not locate ashared key for the host 502/storage array 504 pair, then it sends arequest, as shown by arrow 702 on FIG. 7, to the EKM server 506 toretrieve the shared key that corresponds to the shared key identifierreceived in the SKE SA Init Request message. In response to receivingthe request from the LKM 528, the EKM server 506 authenticates the LKM528 and sends the shared key to the LKM 528 on the storage array 504 asshown by arrow 704 in FIG. 7. In accordance with one or more embodimentsof the present invention, upon receiving the shared key, the LKM 528 maystart a shared key rekey timer that is used to limit that amount of timethat the shared key may be used before a rekey, or refresh, is required.The amount of time may be based on system policies. Because thedifferent nodes may have different policies, the amount of timeindicated by the shared key rekey timer on LKM 528 may be different thanthe amount of time indicated by the shared key rekey timer on LKM 520.In accordance with one or more embodiments of the present invention, inaddition or alternatively to an amount of time, the shared key rekeytimer can expire based on a number of data exchanges between the sourcenode and the target node. When the shared key rekey timer expires, theLKM 528 initiates a process to obtain a new shared key from the EKMserver 506 as described below in reference to FIG. 15.

In response to the LKM 528 having or obtaining a valid shared key, theLKM 528 generates an SKE SA Init Response message that includes a nonceand security parameter index (SPI) created by the LKM 528 for the securecommunication between the channels. The SKE SA Init Response message issent to HBA 522 as shown by arrow 710 in FIG. 7. The responder (ortarget) HBA 522 sends the SKE SA Init Response message to the initiatorHBA 518 on host 502 as shown by arrow 706 in FIG. 7. In accordance withone or more embodiments of the present invention, the SKE SA InitResponse message is sent as clear text (i.e., it is not encrypted).

It is to be understood that the block diagram of FIG. 7 is not intendedto indicate that the computing environment 700 is to include all of thecomponents shown in FIG. 7. Rather, the computing environment 700 caninclude any appropriate fewer or additional components not illustratedin FIG. 7, with some components shown in FIG. 7 combined or thefunctions performed by one or more components performed by different orseveral components. For example, there may be one or more additionalnodes (e.g., hosts and/or storage arrays). Further, the embodimentsdescribed herein with respect to computing environment 700 may beimplemented with any appropriate logic, wherein the logic, as referredto herein, can include any suitable hardware (e.g., a processor, anembedded controller, or an application specific integrated circuit,among others), software (e.g., an application, among others), firmware,or any suitable combination of hardware, software, and firmware, invarious embodiments.

Turning now to FIG. 8, a process 800 for SKE SA initializationprocessing and message generation at a node of a target channel isgenerally shown in accordance with one or more embodiments of thepresent invention. All or a portion of the process 800 can be performed,for example by an LKM such as, LKM 528 of FIG. 7. The process 800 beginsat block 802 with the LKM receiving an SKE SA Init Request messagerequesting the initialization of secure communication between theinitiator and responder channels. For example, the initiator channel canbe HBA 106 of FIG. 1 and the responder channel can be HBA 114 of FIG. 1.It is determined at block 804 whether the responder HBA has beenregistered with the LKM on the responder node. If the responder HBA hasnot been registered with the LKM, processing continues at block 808 withrejecting the request (e.g., because the LKM cannot determine thesecurity capabilities of the responder HBA).

If it is determined, at block 804, that the responder HBA is registeredwith the LKM, then processing continues at block 806. At block 806, itis determined whether an SA already exists between the node where theinitiator channel is located (the initiator node) and the node where theresponder channel is located (the responder node). If an SA alreadyexists, then processing continues at block 808 with rejecting therequest.

If it is determined, at block 806, that an SA does not already existbetween the initiator node and the responder node, then processingcontinues at block 810 with creating the SA. Once an SA state has beencreated at block 810 for the initiator node/responder node pair,processing continues at block 812 with determining whether a shared keyfor the initiator node/responder node pair exists at the responder LKM.If a shared key can be located on the responder LKM for the initiatornode/responder node pair, then processing continues at block 820. Atblock 820, a nonce and an SPI are generated for the responder channeland at block 822 keys that will be used in the encryption and decryptionbetween the initiator channel and the responder channel are derived atthe responder node. The keys can be generated using the nonce and SPI ofthe responder, the nonce and SPI of the initiator, and the shared key.

Key derivation can be based on pseudo random function (PRF) parametersnegotiated in a SA payload of an SKE SA Init message exchangeestablished between an initiator and responder. “PRF+” can be a basicoperator for generating keys for use in authentication and encryptionmode. Key generation can occur over multiple steps. For example, as afirst step, a seeding key called “SKEYSEED” can be generated and definedas SKEYSEED=prf(Ni|Nr, Secret_Key), where Ni and Nr are nonces, and theSecret_Key is a shared secret obtained from an EKM, such as EKM server506. As a second step, a series of seven keys can be generated. For SKE,there can be five keys and two salts, for example, assuming that thatSKE SA is protected by a method that requires a salt. A salt is randomdata that can be used as an additional input to a one-way function thathashes data, a password or passphrase. Salts can be generated as part ofkey material. For example, a multiple-byte salt can be used as part ofan initialization vector (IV) input to a hash-based messageauthentication code (HMAC). As a further example, 32-byte keys and4-byte salts can be generated with:

{SK_d|SK_ei|Salt_ei|SK_er|Salt_er|SK_pi|SK_pr}=prf-+(SKEYSEED,Ni|Nr|SPIi|SPIr)

Where: Inputs

-   -   Ni, Nr can be 16-byte nonces from respective SKE_SA_Init        messages;    -   SPIi and SPIT can be 8-byte parent SA SPI values from an SKE        Header of respective SKE_SA_Init messages and can be used for        authentication;        and outputs    -   SK_d is another seeding key used to generate the data transfer        keys (for the child SA) in the third step;    -   SK_ei, Salt_ei, SK_er and Salt_er are the keys and salts used to        encrypt SKE_Auth messages and any subsequent messages under the        parent SA; and    -   SK_pi and SK_pr are keys used to generate the Authentication        Data for the AUTH payload in the SKE_Auth messages.

For authentication only, these are all of the keys that may be needed.For encryption of user data, the third step generates the data transferkeys and salts. The third step can derive keys and salts for a child SA,starting with a new recursive invocation of the PRF.

At block 824, an SKE SA Init Response message that includes anidentifier of the shared key as well as the nonce and SPI created by theLKM at the responder node for the secure communication between thechannels is built by the LKM at the responder node. At block 826, theSKE SA Init Response message is sent to the responder channel and theresponder channel sends the SKE SA Init Response message to theinitiator channel on the initiator node via, for example, a SAN network.

If it is determined at block 812 that a shared key does not exist forthe initiator node/responder node pair, then processing continues atblock 816. At block 816, it is determined whether a device group existsfor the initiator node/responder node pair. Determining whether thedevice group exists can include the LKM asking the EKM if a device groupexists for the initiator node/responder node pair, and the EKMresponding with an identifier of the corresponding shared key if thedevice group does exist or responding with an error message if it doesnot. If it is determined that the device group does exist, processingcontinues at block 818 with obtaining the shared key from the EKM forthe initiator node/responder node pair and processing continues at block820 with generating a responder SPI and nonce. In accordance with one ormore embodiments of the present invention, the shared key and shared keyidentifier are stored in volatile memory at the responder node so thatthe shared key is not saved when the responder node is powered off orrestarted.

If it is determined at block 816 that a device group does not exist onthe responder LKM for the initiator node/responder node pair, block 814is performed and the initiator node/requestor node pair joins a devicegroup. Processing continues at block 818.

The process flow diagram of FIG. 8 is not intended to indicate that theoperations of the process 800 are to be executed in any particularorder, or that all of the operations of the process 800 are to beincluded in every case. Additionally, the process 800 can include anysuitable number of additional operations.

FIG. 9 depicts a block diagram of a computing environment 900 forgenerating an SKE authentication request (also referred to herein as an“SKE Auth Request”) based on an SKE SA initialization response accordingto one or more embodiments of the present invention. The computingenvironment 900 shown in FIG. 9 is similar to the computing environment500, 700 shown in FIGS. 5 and 7 with the addition of building an SKEAuth Request message at the host 502 for the storage array 504.

As shown by arrow 526 of FIG. 9, the HBA 518 on host 502 transmits anSKE SA Init Request message to HBA 522 on storage array 504. As shown byarrow 706 of FIG. 9, the HBA 522 on storage array 504 sends an SKE SAInit Response message, which is received by the HBA 518 on host 502. Inresponse to receiving the SKE SA Init Response message, the HBA 518sends the SKE SA Init Response message to the LKM 520 located on thehost 502 (as shown in by arrow 902 of FIG. 9). In response to receivingthe message, the LKM 520 on the host 502 verifies the SKE SA InitResponse message and confirms that the device group of the initiatornode and responder node forms a valid SA pair. The LKM 520 on the host502 derives a set of cryptographic keys and builds an SKE Auth Requestmessage. The set of cryptographic keys can be derived, for example,using a process as previously described. The SKE Auth Request messagecan include a proposal list based on security capabilities supported bythe HBA 518 to assist in selecting an encryption algorithm that is alsosupported through HBA 522 on storage array 504. The payload of the SKEAuth Request message can be encrypted using a different encryptionstandard that need not be the same as the encryption algorithm selectedbased on the proposal list. In some embodiments where encryption is notdirectly supported by the HBA 518 or HBA 522, an option in the proposallist may be no encryption—authenticate only. The SKE Auth Requestmessage is sent to the HBA 518, or channel, that requested that data besent to the HBA 522 on storage array 504. This in shown by arrow 904 inFIG. 9. The requesting (or initiator) HBA 518 sends the SKE Auth Requestmessage, via a SAN network for example, to the target HBA 522 on storagearray 504 as shown by arrow 906 in FIG. 9.

It is to be understood that the block diagram of FIG. 9 is not intendedto indicate that the computing environment 900 is to include all of thecomponents shown in FIG. 9. Rather, the computing environment 900 caninclude any appropriate fewer or additional components not illustratedin FIG. 9, with some components shown in FIG. 9 combined or thefunctions performed by one or more components performed by different orseveral components. For example, there may be one or more additionalnodes (e.g., hosts and/or storage arrays). Further, the embodimentsdescribed herein with respect to computing environment 900 may beimplemented with any appropriate logic, wherein the logic, as referredto herein, can include any suitable hardware (e.g., a processor, anembedded controller, or an application specific integrated circuit,among others), software (e.g., an application, among others), firmware,or any suitable combination of hardware, software, and firmware, invarious embodiments.

Turning now to FIG. 10, a process 1000 for generating an SKEauthentication request is generally shown in accordance with one or moreembodiments of the present invention. All or a portion of the process1000 can be performed, for example by an LKM such as, LKM 520 of FIG. 9.The process 1000 begins at block 1002 with the LKM receiving an SKE SAInit message. At block 1004, the LKM can determine whether the SKE SAInit message is an SKE SA Init Response message, and if so, the process1000 proceeds to block 1006. At block 1006, the LKM can check the SAstate to determine whether the channel is an initiator. In someembodiments, the channel, such as HBA 518, may communicate with itselfin a loopback mode of operation, where the initiator node is also theresponder node. Loopback mode can be used for testing and/or as aspecial FICON mode of operation with the SA mode set to both initiatorand responder. If the SA state is an initiator, then at block 1008, theLKM can perform a message sequencing check to verify that the lastmessage received at an SA state machine associated with the initiatornode and responder node pair was a Start LKM message. At block 1010,based on confirming that the last message received was a Start LKMmessage, and thus not an unexpected message sequence, the LKM can checka payload type of the SKE SA Init Response message to determine whethera payload type of the SKE SA Init Response message is a Notify messagetype. A Notify message type can indicate a fault or other condition atthe responder node that prevents further progress in the authenticationsequence. For example, the LKM of the responder node, such as LKM 528,may have a communication error, a key access error, a sequencing error,or other such condition.

If the SKE SA Init message is not an SKE SA Init Response message as averification result at block 1004, an error handler 1012 can be invoked.The error handler 1012 can also be invoked if the SA state is anon-compliant SA state at block 1006, an unexpected message sequence isdetected at block 1008, or if the payload type is the Notify messagetype at block 1010. The error handler 1012 may reject the SKE SA Initmessage received at block 1002 and support a retry sequence as part of arecovery process in case the error condition was a temporary condition.Under some conditions, such as a shared key error or securityassociation error, the error handler 1012 may perform a recovery processthat reinitializes the communication sequence, for instance, by making anew request to the EKM server 506 for a shared key between the initiatornode and the responder node. Where a retry fails or under conditionswhere a retry is not performed, resources reserved to support thecommunication sequence are released.

After confirming that the SKE SA Init Response message is not a Notifymessage type at block 1010, the process 1000 advances to block 1014. Atblock 1014, the LKM can derive a set of cryptographic keys based on anSA payload of the SKE SA Init Response message. Key derivation can beperformed, for example, using the steps as previously described inreference to process 800 of FIG. 8. At block 1016, the LKM can computean initiator signature based at least in part on one or more parametersextracted from the SKE SA Init Response message. For example, theinitiator signature can be based on a responder nonce, a shared key, aninitiator identifier, and at least one key from the set of cryptographickeys. For instance, the SKE SA Init Response message may include SPI andnonce values as previously described. The LKM can compute an HMAC basedon the inputs, and the responder node may also independently compute theinitiator signature as a further authentication of the initiator node.

The initiator channel, such as HBA 518, can report security capabilitiesto the LKM of the host, which are used by the LKM build to a proposallist based on one or more security capabilities supported by theinitiator channel at block 1018. For example, the capabilities caninclude a list of encryption algorithms supported by the initiator node.The encryption algorithms may be stored as a priority list, forinstance, defining preferences based on computational complexity oranother metric used to establish preferences. The priority list maychange over time to ensure that different encryption algorithms areselected over a period of time to further enhance security. Forinstance, a PRF can be used to establish the priorities in the proposallist.

At block 1020, the LKM builds an SKE Auth Request message based at leastin part on the set of cryptographic keys and the proposal list, whereone or more of the cryptographic keys are used to compute the initiatorsignature that is included with the proposal list in the SKE AuthRequest message. The initiator node can encrypt the payload of the SKEAuth Request message using a predetermined encryption algorithm. Atblock 1022, the LKM sends the SKE Auth Request message with encryptedpayload to the initiator channel, which transmits the SKE Auth Requestmessage to the responder channel of the responder node.

The process flow diagram of FIG. 10 is not intended to indicate that theoperations of the process 1000 are to be executed in any particularorder, or that all of the operations of the process 1000 are to beincluded in every case. Additionally, the process 1000 can include anysuitable number of additional operations.

FIG. 11 depicts a block diagram of a computing environment 1100 forgenerating an SKE authentication response (also referred to herein as an“SKE Auth Response”) based on an SKE authentication request according toone or more embodiments of the present invention. The computingenvironment 1100 shown in FIG. 11 is similar to the computingenvironment 500, 700, 900 shown in FIGS. 5, 7 and 9 with the addition ofbuilding an SKE Auth Response message at the storage array 504 for thehost 502.

As shown by arrow 526 of FIG. 11, the HBA 518 on host 502 transmits anSKE SA Init Request message to HBA 522 on storage array 504. As shown byarrow 706 of FIG. 11, the HBA 522 on storage array 504 sends an SKE SAInit Response message, which is received by the HBA 518 on host 502. Inresponse to receiving the SKE SA Init Response message, the host 502sends an SKE Auth Request message (arrow 906) to the storage array 504.In response to receiving the SKE Auth Request message, the HBA 522 sendsthe SKE Auth Request message to the LKM 528 located on the storage array504 (as shown in by arrow 1102 of FIG. 11). In response to receiving themessage, the LKM 528 on the storage array 504 verifies the SKE AuthRequest message and confirms that the device group of the initiator nodeand responder node forms a valid SA pair along with other expected stateand sequence values. The LKM 528 decrypts the payload of the SKE AuthRequest message and performs validation checks. The LKM 528 can performa signature check to further authenticate the initiator node. The SKEAuth Request message can include a proposal list based on securitycapabilities supported by the HBA 518 to assist in selecting anencryption algorithm that is also supported through HBA 522 on storagearray 504. The payload of the SKE Auth Request message can be encryptedusing a different encryption standard that need not be the same as theencryption algorithm selected based on the proposal list. Once anencryption algorithm is selected from the proposal list that iscompatible with the HBA 522, the LKM 528 can build an SKE Auth Responsemessage that identifies the selected encryption algorithm and encryptsthe payload, for instance, using the same encryption algorithm that wasused to encrypt the payload of the SKE Auth Request message.

The SKE Auth Response message is sent to the HBA 522, or channel. Thisin shown by arrow 1104 in FIG. 11. The responder HBA 522 on storagearray 504 sends the SKE Auth Response message, via a SAN network forexample, to the initiator HBA 518 on the host 502 as shown by arrow 1106in FIG. 11.

It is to be understood that the block diagram of FIG. 11 is not intendedto indicate that the computing environment 1100 is to include all of thecomponents shown in FIG. 11. Rather, the computing environment 1100 caninclude any appropriate fewer or additional components not illustratedin FIG. 11, with some components shown in FIG. 11 combined or thefunctions performed by one or more components performed by different orseveral components. For example, there may be one or more additionalnodes (e.g., hosts and/or storage arrays). Further, the embodimentsdescribed herein with respect to computing environment 1100 may beimplemented with any appropriate logic, wherein the logic, as referredto herein, can include any suitable hardware (e.g., a processor, anembedded controller, or an application specific integrated circuit,among others), software (e.g., an application, among others), firmware,or any suitable combination of hardware, software, and firmware, invarious embodiments.

FIG. 12 depicts a process 1200 for SKE authentication message processingaccording to one or more embodiments of the present invention. All or aportion of the process 1200 can be performed, for example by an LKM suchas, LKM 528 of FIG. 11. The process 1200 begins at block 1202 with theLKM receiving an SKE Auth message. The LKM can determine whether the SKEAuth message is an SKE Auth Request message as a validation check, wherethe LKM may support both SKE Auth Request and Response message types.

At block 1204, a state check can be performed based on an SA of theinitiator node and the responder node. Examples of state checks caninclude confirming that the SA exists for initiator node and respondernode pair with a shared key. An SA mode check can confirm that the modeof the SA is set to Responder. The state check at block 1204 may alsoinclude verifying that a last received message state and a last sentmessage state of the LKM 528 match expected values. For example, amessage sequence state machine can be checked to confirm that the lastmessage sent from the responder node was an SKE SA Init Response messageand the last message received was an SKE SA Init Request message.

If the state is ok (e.g., all expected values are verified) at block1204, then the payload type of the SKE Auth Request message can bechecked at block 1206 to determine whether the message is a Notifymessage type. A Notify message type can indicate a fault or othercondition at the initiator node that prevents further progress in theauthentication sequence. For example, the LKM of the initiator node,such as LKM 520, may have a communication error, a key access error, asequencing error, or other such condition. The Notify message typeindicator can appear unencrypted within the payload of the SKE AuthRequest message.

If the message payload is not a Notify message type at block 1206, thenthe message payload can be decrypted at block 1208. After decryption,further validation checks can be performed at block 1210. Validationchecks of the SKE Auth Request message can include, for example,checking one or more message header parameters and an identifier of thepayload based on decrypting the payload. Parameters that can be checkedin the message header may include a version and a payload length. Thedecrypted payload of the SKE Auth Request message can be checked toconfirm that a world-wide node name or world-wide port name identifiedin the message matches an expected value based on the SKE SA InitRequest message.

The LKM 528 can compute an initiator signature at block 1212, and theinitiator signature can be checked at block 1214. The initiatorsignature can be computed based on previously determined values orvalues extracted from a previous message, such as the SKE SA InitRequest message. For example, the initiator signature can be computed atLKM 528 based on a responder nonce, a shared key, an initiatoridentifier, and at least one key from the set of cryptographic keys. Thecomputed initiator signature can be compared to the initiator signaturereceived in the SKE Auth Request message, where the initiator signaturemay be extracted from the payload of the SKE Auth Request message afterdecryption as a further validation.

If the initiator signature check passes at block 1214, a respondersignature can be computed at block 1216. The responder signature can becomputed based on an initiator nonce, a shared key, a responderidentifier, and at least one key from a set of cryptographic keys. Oneor more values used in computing the responder signature may be based onvalues extracted from a previous message, such as the SKE SA InitRequest message.

At block 1218, an encryption algorithm is selected for encrypting databetween the initiator channel and the responder channel based on aproposal list received in the SKE Auth Request message and capabilitiesof the highest priority encryption algorithm that is supported by theresponder node. The capabilities of the HBA 522 can be reported to theLKM 528 to assist the LKM 528 in selecting an encryption algorithm fromthe proposal list that will be supported by the initiator node and theresponder node. If it is determined at block 1220 that an algorithmselection is not possible, where the responder node supports none of theencryption algorithms from the proposal list, then the SKE Auth Requestmessage is rejected at block 1222. The SKE Auth Request message can alsobe rejected at block 1222 based on an unexpected state at block 1204, aNotify message type detected at block 1206, a validation check failureat block 1210, or a signature check failure at block 1214. Rejection ofthe SKE Auth Request message can support a retry option, where theresponder node is prepared to accept a replacement SKE Auth Requestmessage. There may be a predetermined number of retries supported beforethe communication session is canceled and associated values are purged.

If an encryption algorithm selection is possible at block 1220, then LKM528 builds an SKE Auth Response message at block 1224. Building of theSKE Auth Response message can be based at least in part on a successfulstate check, a successful validation, and selecting one of theencryption algorithms from the proposal list. The payload of the SKEAuth Response message can include the responder signature as computed inblock 1216 and an indicator of the selected encryption algorithm basedon the selection at block 1218. The payload of the SKE Auth Responsemessage is encrypted, for example, using the same encryption algorithmas used for encrypting the payload of the SKE Auth Request message. TheSKE Auth Response message is encrypted independent of the proposal list.

An LKM Done message is built at block 1226. The LKM Done message caninclude one or more session keys, an initiator security SPI, and aresponder SPI to enable encrypted communication between the initiatorchannel and responder channel using the selected encryption algorithm.The session keys, also referred to as data transfer keys, can becomputed based on the selected encryption algorithm and one or more ofthe set of cryptographic keys previously derived as seeding keys. Thesession keys can support encryption and decryption of data transfersbetween the initiator channel and responder channel in combination withknowledge of the selected encryption algorithm by both the initiatornode and the responder node. The LKM Done message may also set the SAstate to complete and may trigger further cleanup actions associatedwith the authentication process. In addition, a session key rekey timermay be started. The session key rekey timer can trigger a rekey processas described below with respect to FIG. 15. The session key rekey timercan expire based on one or both of an amount of time expiring and anumber of exchanges occurring between the target node and the sourcenode.

The SKE Auth Response message and the LKM Done message are sent from theLKM 528 to the HBA 522 at block 1228. After the HBA 522 transmits theSKE Auth Response message to HBA 518, the LKM Done message can triggerreconfiguring of the HBA 522 to communicate with the HBA 518 using theselected encryption algorithm.

The process flow diagram of FIG. 12 is not intended to indicate that theoperations of the process 1200 are to be executed in any particularorder, or that all of the operations of the process 1200 are to beincluded in every case. Additionally, the process 1200 can include anysuitable number of additional operations.

FIG. 13 depicts a block diagram of a computing environment 1300 for HBAkey loading based on an SKE authentication response according to one ormore embodiments of the present invention. The computing environment1300 shown in FIG. 13 is similar to the computing environment 500, 700,900, 1100 shown in FIGS. 5, 7, 9 and 11 with the addition of SKE AuthResponse message processing at the host 502 to finish establishing anencrypted link path.

As shown by arrow 526 of FIG. 13, the HBA 518 on host 502 transmits anSKE SA Init Request message to HBA 522 on storage array 504. As shown byarrow 706 of FIG. 13, the HBA 522 on storage array 504 sends an SKE SAInit Response message, which is received by the HBA 518 on host 502. Inresponse to receiving the SKE SA Init Response message, the host 502sends an SKE Auth Request message (arrow 906) to the storage array 504.In response to receiving the SKE Auth Request message, the HBA 522responds with an SKE Auth Response message (arrow 1106) to the HBA 518.

In response to receiving the SKE Auth Response message, the HBA 518sends the SKE Auth Response message to the LKM 520 located on the host502 (as shown in by arrow 1302 of FIG. 13). In response to receiving themessage, the LKM 520 on the host 502 verifies that the SKE Auth Responsewas received and confirms that the device group of the initiator nodeand responder node forms a valid SA pair along with other expected stateand sequence values. The LKM 520 decrypts the payload of the SKE AuthResponse message and performs validation checks. The LKM 520 can performa signature check to further authenticate the responder node. The SKEAuth Response message can include a selected encryption algorithmcorresponding to one or the encryption algorithms previously sent in theproposal list of the SKE Auth Request message. In some embodiments, theselected encryption algorithm may be no encryption—authenticate only.The payload of the SKE Auth Response message can be encrypted using adifferent encryption standard that need not be the same as theencryption algorithm selected based on the proposal list. Once anencryption algorithm is selected from the proposal list that iscompatible with the HBA 518 and HBA 522, the LKM 520 can store theselection locally in volatile memory. The LKM 520 can build an LKM Donemessage that identifies the selected encryption algorithm, session keys,and SPIs to support the HBA 518 in encrypting and decryptingcommunications with the HBA 522. The LKM Done message can be sent to theHBA 518 as shown by arrow 1304.

The HBA 518 can be configured to communicate with the HBA 522 using theinformation from the LKM Done message and finish establishing anencrypted link path using the selected encryption algorithm between theHBA 518 and HBA 522 as depicted by arrow 1306.

It is to be understood that the block diagram of FIG. 13 is not intendedto indicate that the computing environment 1300 is to include all of thecomponents shown in FIG. 13. Rather, the computing environment 1300 caninclude any appropriate fewer or additional components not illustratedin FIG. 13, with some components shown in FIG. 13 combined or thefunctions performed by one or more components performed by different orseveral components. For example, there may be one or more additionalnodes (e.g., hosts and/or storage arrays). Further, the embodimentsdescribed herein with respect to computing environment 1300 may beimplemented with any appropriate logic, wherein the logic, as referredto herein, can include any suitable hardware (e.g., a processor, anembedded controller, or an application specific integrated circuit,among others), software (e.g., an application, among others), firmware,or any suitable combination of hardware, software, and firmware, invarious embodiments.

FIG. 14 depicts a process 1400 for channel key loading of an HBA basedon an SKE authentication response according to one or more embodimentsof the present invention. All or a portion of the process 1400 can beperformed, for example by an LKM such as, LKM 520 of FIG. 13. Theprocess 1400 begins at block 1402 with the LKM receiving an SKE Authmessage. At block 1404, the LKM can determine whether the SKE Authmessage is an SKE Auth Response message as a validation check, where theLKM may support both SKE Auth Request and Response message types.

After confirming that the SKE Auth Response message was received atblock 1404, the process 1400 continues to block 1406. At block 1406, astate check can be performed based on an SA of the initiator node andthe responder node. Examples of state checks can include confirming thatthe SA exists for initiator node and responder node pair with a sharedkey. An SA mode check can confirm that the mode of the SA is set toInitiator. The state check at block 1406 may also include verifying thata last received message state and a last sent message state of the LKM520 match expected values. For example, a message sequence state machinecan be checked to confirm that the last message sent from the initiatornode was an SKE Auth Request message and the last message received wasan SKE SA Init Response message.

If the state is okay (e.g., all expected values are verified) at block1406, then the payload type of the SKE Auth Response message can bechecked at block 1408 to determine whether the message is a Notifymessage type. A Notify message type can indicate a fault or othercondition at the initiator node that prevents further progress in theauthentication sequence. For example, the LKM of the responder node,such as LKM 528, may have a communication error, a key access error, asequencing error, or other such condition. The Notify message typeindicator can appear unencrypted within the payload of the SKE AuthResponse message.

If the message payload is not a Notify message type at block 1408, thenthe message payload can be decrypted at block 1410. After decryption,further validation checks can be performed at block 1412. Validationchecks of the SKE Auth Response message can include, for example,checking one or more message header parameters and an identifier of thepayload based on decrypting the payload. Parameters that can be checkedin the message header may include a version and a payload length. Thedecrypted payload of the SKE Auth Response message can be checked toconfirm that a world-wide node name or world-wide port name identifiedin the message matches an expected value based on the Start LKM message.

The LKM 520 can compute a responder signature at block 1414, and theresponder signature can be checked at block 1416. The respondersignature can be computed based on an initiator nonce, a shared key, aresponder identifier, and at least one key from a set of cryptographickeys. One or more values used in computing the responder signature maybe based on values extracted from a previous message, such as the SKE SAInit Response message. The computed responder signature can be comparedto the responder signature received in the SKE Auth Response message,where the responder signature may be extracted from the payload of theSKE Auth Response message after decryption as a further validation. Ifthe signature check validation fails at block 1416, then the SKE AuthResponse message is rejected at block 1418. The SKE Auth Responsemessage can also be rejected at block 1418 based on an unexpectedmessage at block 1404, an unexpected state at block 1406, a Notifymessage type detected at block 1408, or a validation check failure atblock 1412. Rejection of the SKE Auth Response message can support aretry option, where the initiator node is prepared to accept areplacement SKE Auth Response message. There may be a predeterminednumber of retries supported before the communication session is canceledand associated values are purged. If the responder signature checkpasses at block 1416, then the selected encryption algorithm from theSKE Auth Response message is identified and saved at block 1420.

An LKM Done message is built at block 1422. The LKM Done message caninclude one or more session keys, an initiator security SPI, and aresponder SPI to enable encrypted communication between the initiatorchannel and responder channel using the selected encryption algorithm.The session keys, also referred to as data transfer keys, can becomputed based on the selected encryption algorithm and one or more ofthe set of cryptographic keys previously derived as seeding keys. Thesession keys can support encryption and decryption of data transfersbetween the initiator channel and responder channel in combination withknowledge of the selected encryption algorithm by both the initiatornode and the responder node. The LKM Done message may also set the SAstate to complete and may trigger further cleanup actions associatedwith the authentication process.

At block 1424, a session key rekey timer is started. The session keyrekey timer can trigger a rekey process as described below with respectto FIG. 15. The session key rekey timer can expire based on one or bothof an amount of time expiring and a number of exchanges occurringbetween the target node and the source node. Because their correspondingnodes may have different policies, the session key rekey timer at theinitiator channel may expire at a different time than the session keyrekey timer at the responder channel. At block 1426, the LKM Donemessage can be sent to the initiator channel after starting the sessionkey rekey timer. Upon receiving the LKM Done message, the HBA 518 canload keys to support encrypted communication with the HBA 522 based onthe selected encryption algorithm. Thereafter, data transfers betweenHBA 518 and HBA 522 are performed using the selected encryptionalgorithm and session keys until session completion or rekeying. Inaccordance with some embodiments of the present invention, the rekeyprocess is controlled by the initiator side only (e.g., the initiatornode, or source node).

The process flow diagram of FIG. 14 is not intended to indicate that theoperations of the process 1400 are to be executed in any particularorder, or that all of the operations of the process 1400 are to beincluded in every case. Additionally, the process 1400 can include anysuitable number of additional operations.

Turning now to FIG. 15, a process 1500 for refreshing keys in acomputing environment that uses SKE to provide secure data transfer isgenerally shown in accordance with one or more embodiments of thepresent invention. All or a portion of the process 1500 can beperformed, for example by an LKM such as, LKM 520 or LKM 528 of FIG. 5.As described previously, in accordance with one more embodiment of thepresent invention shared key rekey timers and session key rekey timersare set based on system policies. In accordance with one or moreembodiments of the present invention, the rekey timers are initiated andtracked by LKMs at each of the nodes.

The process 1500 begins at block 1502 with a rekey timer expiring. Atblock 1504, it is determined whether the rekey timer is the shared keyrekey timer or the session key rekey timer. If it is determined, atblock 1504, that the shared key rekey timer has expired, then processingcontinues at block 1506. As described previously, the shared key rekeytimer relates to the amount of time that the shared key obtained from anEKM, such as EKM 506 of FIG. 5, remains valid for communication betweentwo nodes, such as host 502 and storage array 504 of FIG. 5. Inaccordance with one or more embodiments of the present invention, theLKM at each node in the computing environment controls (e.g., initiatesand monitors) a separate shared key rekey timer for each of the sharedkeys that exist between the node and other nodes in the computingenvironment. Each shared key rekey timer is associated with a devicegroup that includes a pair of nodes (with each pair including the nodewhere the LKM is executing). In addition, the LKM stores the currentvalue of the shared key and the shared key identifier for each of theshared keys that exist between the node and other nodes for securecommunication.

At block 1506, it is determined whether a device group exists betweenthe pair of nodes associated with the shared key rekey timer. If it isdetermined that a device group does not exist, then processing continuesat block 1508 with creating a device group between the pair of nodes ina manner such as that described above with respect to FIGS. 5 and 6.Once the device group is created, processing continues at block 1510.

If it is determined at block 1506, that the device group exists betweenthe pair of nodes, then processing continues at block 1510. At block1510, a new shared key is created. In accordance with one or moreembodiments of the present invention, the LKM sends a request to an EKM,such as EKM server 506 of FIG. 5, for a new shared key for the devicegroup that includes the pair of nodes. In response to receiving therequest, the EKM creates a new key for the device group and associatesthe new key with the shared key identifier of the device group. The EKMsends the new key to the requesting LKM. The receiving of the shared keyby the LKM may be a multiple step process where subsequent to requestingthe updated key from the EKM (or alternatively in response to receivinga notification form the EKM that a new key has been created), the LKMsends a second request that includes the shared key identifier to theEKM to request the current key (i.e., the updated key). The EKM respondsby returning the value of the shared key corresponding to the shared keyidentifier to the requesting LKM. At block 1512, the updated key isstored, as the current shared key, by the LKM. In accordance with one ormore embodiments of the present invention, the LKM keeps track of thecurrent communication sessions, or SAs, between channels on the nodewhere the LKM is executing and other channels on other nodes. Each ofthe current communication sessions continue with the previous sharedkey, that is the shared key that was used prior to the new shared keybeing created, until the session ends or a session key rekey timerexpires. Once the LKM determines that no more current communicationsessions are using the previous shared key, the previous shared key isrevoked at block 1514. In accordance with one or more embodiments of thepresent invention, the LKM stored information about the status ofcurrent communication sessions using the SA.

If it is determined, at block 1504, that the session key rekey timer hasexpired, then processing continues at block 1516. As describedpreviously, the session key rekey timer relates to the amount of timethat the session key (which may include several keys) remains valid fora communication session between two channels, such as an HBA 518 and anHBA 522 of FIG. 5. In accordance with one or more embodiments of thepresent invention, the LKM at each node in the computing environmentcontrols (e.g., initiates and monitors) a separate session key rekeytimer for each of the communication sessions that are in process betweenchannels on the node and channels on other nodes in the computingenvironment. Each session key rekey timer is associated with a pair ofchannels (with each pair including a channel on the node where the LKMis executing).

At block 1516, the LKM accesses the current shared key associated withthe node(s) where the pair of channels that are associated with theexpired session key rekey timer are located. At block 1518, the LKMbuilds an SKE SA Init Request message in a manner such as that describedabove with respect to FIGS. 5 and 6. At block 1520, the SKE SA InitRequest message is sent to the channel on the other node to initiate therenegotiation of the session key(s). In accordance with one or moreembodiments of the present invention, the renegotiation includesexchanging the SKE SA Init Request, the SKE SA Init Response, the SKEAuth Request, and the SKE Auth response messages between the pair ofchannels.

Providing the ability to refresh, or rekey, the keys provides anotherlayer of security to the system. In accordance with some embodiments ofthe present invention, the shared keys are refreshed less frequentlythan the session keys.

The process flow diagram of FIG. 15 is not intended to indicate that theoperations of the process 1500 are to be executed in any particularorder, or that all of the operations of the process 1500 are to beincluded in every case. Additionally, the process 1500 can include anysuitable number of additional operations.

Although various embodiments are described herein, other variations andembodiments are possible.

One or more aspects of the present invention are inextricably tied tocomputer technology and facilitate processing within a computer,improving performance thereof. In one example, performance enhancementis provided in authenticating links between nodes. These links are usedto securely transmit messages between the nodes coupled by the links.One or more aspects reduce link initialization time, increaseproductivity within the computer environment, enhance security withinthe computer environment, and/or increase system performance.

Further other types of computing environments may also incorporate anduse one or more aspects of the present invention, including, but notlimited to, emulation environments, an example of which is describedwith reference to FIG. 16A. In this example, a computing environment 35includes, for instance, a native central processing unit (CPU) 37, amemory 39, and one or more input/output devices and/or interfaces 41coupled to one another via, for example, one or more buses 43 and/orother connections. As examples, computing environment 35 may include aPowerPC processor offered by International Business MachinesCorporation, Armonk, N.Y.; and/or other machines based on architecturesoffered by International Business Machines Corporation, Intel, or othercompanies.

Native central processing unit 37 includes one or more native registers45, such as one or more general purpose registers and/or one or morespecial purpose registers used during processing within the environment.These registers include information that represents the state of theenvironment at any particular point in time.

Moreover, native central processing unit 37 executes instructions andcode that are stored in memory 39. In one particular example, thecentral processing unit executes emulator code 47 stored in memory 39.This code enables the computing environment configured in onearchitecture to emulate another architecture. For instance, emulatorcode 47 allows machines based on architectures other than thez/Architecture, such as PowerPC processors, or other servers orprocessors, to emulate the z/Architecture and to execute software andinstructions developed based on the z/Architecture.

Further details relating to emulator code 47 are described withreference to FIG. 16B. Guest instructions 49 stored in memory 39comprise software instructions (e.g., correlating to machineinstructions) that were developed to be executed in an architectureother than that of native CPU 37. For example, guest instructions 49 mayhave been designed to execute on a z/Architecture processor, butinstead, are being emulated on native CPU 37, which may be, for example,an Intel processor. In one example, emulator code 47 includes aninstruction fetching routine 51 to obtain one or more guest instructions49 from memory 39, and to optionally provide local buffering for theinstructions obtained. It also includes an instruction translationroutine 53 to determine the type of guest instruction that has beenobtained and to translate the guest instruction into one or morecorresponding native instructions 55. This translation includes, forinstance, identifying the function to be performed by the guestinstruction and choosing the native instruction(s) to perform thatfunction.

Further, emulator code 47 includes an emulation control routine 57 tocause the native instructions to be executed. Emulation control routine57 may cause native CPU 37 to execute a routine of native instructionsthat emulate one or more previously obtained guest instructions and, atthe conclusion of such execution, return control to the instructionfetch routine to emulate the obtaining of the next guest instruction ora group of guest instructions. Execution of native instructions 55 mayinclude loading data into a register from memory 39; storing data backto memory from a register; or performing some type of arithmetic orlogic operation, as determined by the translation routine.

Each routine is, for instance, implemented in software, which is storedin memory and executed by native central processing unit 37. In otherexamples, one or more of the routines or operations are implemented infirmware, hardware, software or some combination thereof. The registersof the emulated processor may be emulated using registers 45 of thenative CPU or by using locations in memory 39. In embodiments, guestinstructions 49, native instructions 55 and emulator code 37 may residein the same memory or may be disbursed among different memory devices.

One or more aspects may relate to cloud computing.

It is to be understood that although this disclosure includes a detaileddescription on cloud computing, implementation of the teachings recitedherein are not limited to a cloud computing environment. Rather,embodiments of the present invention are capable of being implemented inconjunction with any other type of computing environment now known orlater developed.

Cloud computing is a model of service delivery for enabling convenient,on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computingresources (e.g., networks, network bandwidth, servers, processing,memory, storage, applications, virtual machines, and services) that canbe rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort orinteraction with a provider of the service. This cloud model may includeat least five characteristics, at least three service models, and atleast four deployment models.

Characteristics are as follows:

On-demand self-service: a cloud consumer can unilaterally provisioncomputing capabilities, such as server time and network storage, asneeded automatically without requiring human interaction with theservice's provider.

Broad network access: capabilities are available over a network andaccessed through standard mechanisms that promote use by heterogeneousthin or thick client platforms (e.g., mobile phones, laptops, and PDAs).

Resource pooling: the provider's computing resources are pooled to servemultiple consumers using a multi-tenant model, with different physicaland virtual resources dynamically assigned and reassigned according todemand. There is a sense of location independence in that the consumergenerally has no control or knowledge over the exact location of theprovided resources but may be able to specify location at a higher levelof abstraction (e.g., country, state, or datacenter).

Rapid elasticity: capabilities can be rapidly and elasticallyprovisioned, in some cases automatically, to quickly scale out andrapidly released to quickly scale in. To the consumer, the capabilitiesavailable for provisioning often appear to be unlimited and can bepurchased in any quantity at any time.

Measured service: cloud systems automatically control and optimizeresource use by leveraging a metering capability at some level ofabstraction appropriate to the type of service (e.g., storage,processing, bandwidth, and active user accounts). Resource usage can bemonitored, controlled, and reported, providing transparency for both theprovider and consumer of the utilized service.

Service Models are as follows:

Software as a Service (SaaS): the capability provided to the consumer isto use the provider's applications running on a cloud infrastructure.The applications are accessible from various client devices through athin client interface such as a web browser (e.g., web-based email). Theconsumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructureincluding network, servers, operating systems, storage, or evenindividual application capabilities, with the possible exception oflimited user-specific application configuration settings.

Platform as a Service (PaaS): the capability provided to the consumer isto deploy onto the cloud infrastructure consumer-created or acquiredapplications created using programming languages and tools supported bythe provider. The consumer does not manage or control the underlyingcloud infrastructure including networks, servers, operating systems, orstorage, but has control over the deployed applications and possiblyapplication hosting environment configurations.

Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS): the capability provided to theconsumer is to provision processing, storage, networks, and otherfundamental computing resources where the consumer is able to deploy andrun arbitrary software, which can include operating systems andapplications. The consumer does not manage or control the underlyingcloud infrastructure but has control over operating systems, storage,deployed applications, and possibly limited control of select networkingcomponents (e.g., host firewalls).

Deployment Models are as follows:

Private cloud: the cloud infrastructure is operated solely for anorganization. It may be managed by the organization or a third party andmay exist on-premises or off-premises.

Community cloud: the cloud infrastructure is shared by severalorganizations and supports a specific community that has shared concerns(e.g., mission, security requirements, policy, and complianceconsiderations). It may be managed by the organizations or a third partyand may exist on-premises or off-premises.

Public cloud: the cloud infrastructure is made available to the generalpublic or a large industry group and is owned by an organization sellingcloud services.

Hybrid cloud: the cloud infrastructure is a composition of two or moreclouds (private, community, or public) that remain unique entities butare bound together by standardized or proprietary technology thatenables data and application portability (e.g., cloud bursting forload-balancing between clouds).

A cloud computing environment is service oriented with a focus onstatelessness, low coupling, modularity, and semantic interoperability.At the heart of cloud computing is an infrastructure that includes anetwork of interconnected nodes.

Referring now to FIG. 17, illustrative cloud computing environment 50 isdepicted. As shown, cloud computing environment 50 includes one or morecloud computing nodes 52 with which local computing devices used bycloud consumers, such as, for example, personal digital assistant (PDA)or cellular telephone 54A, desktop computer 54B, laptop computer 54C,and/or automobile computer system 54N may communicate. Nodes 52 maycommunicate with one another. They may be grouped (not shown) physicallyor virtually, in one or more networks, such as Private, Community,Public, or Hybrid clouds as described hereinabove, or a combinationthereof. This allows cloud computing environment 50 to offerinfrastructure, platforms and/or software as services for which a cloudconsumer does not need to maintain resources on a local computingdevice. It is understood that the types of computing devices 54A-N shownin FIG. 17 are intended to be illustrative only and that computing nodes52 and cloud computing environment 50 can communicate with any type ofcomputerized device over any type of network and/or network addressableconnection (e.g., using a web browser).

Referring now to FIG. 18, a set of functional abstraction layersprovided by cloud computing environment 50 (FIG. 17) is shown. It shouldbe understood in advance that the components, layers, and functionsshown in FIG. 18 are intended to be illustrative only and embodiments ofthe invention are not limited thereto. As depicted, the following layersand corresponding functions are provided:

Hardware and software layer 60 includes hardware and softwarecomponents. Examples of hardware components include: mainframes 61; RISC(Reduced Instruction Set Computer) architecture based servers 62;servers 63; blade servers 64; storage devices 65; and networks andnetworking components 66. In some embodiments, software componentsinclude network application server software 67 and database software 68.

Virtualization layer 70 provides an abstraction layer from which thefollowing examples of virtual entities may be provided: virtual servers71; virtual storage 72; virtual networks 73, including virtual privatenetworks; virtual applications and operating systems 74; and virtualclients 75.

In one example, management layer 80 may provide the functions describedbelow. Resource provisioning 81 provides dynamic procurement ofcomputing resources and other resources that are utilized to performtasks within the cloud computing environment. Metering and Pricing 82provide cost tracking as resources are utilized within the cloudcomputing environment, and billing or invoicing for consumption of theseresources. In one example, these resources may include applicationsoftware licenses. Security provides identity verification for cloudconsumers and tasks, as well as protection for data and other resources.User portal 83 provides access to the cloud computing environment forconsumers and system administrators. Service level management 84provides cloud computing resource allocation and management such thatrequired service levels are met. Service Level Agreement (SLA) planningand fulfillment 85 provide pre-arrangement for, and procurement of,cloud computing resources for which a future requirement is anticipatedin accordance with an SLA.

Workloads layer 90 provides examples of functionality for which thecloud computing environment may be utilized. Examples of workloads andfunctions which may be provided from this layer include: mapping andnavigation 91; software development and lifecycle management 92; virtualclassroom education delivery 93; data analytics processing 94;transaction processing 95; and authentication processing 96.

Aspects of the present invention may be a system, a method, and/or acomputer program product at any possible technical detail level ofintegration. The computer program product may include a computerreadable storage medium (or media) having computer readable programinstructions thereon for causing a processor to carry out aspects of thepresent invention.

The computer readable storage medium can be a tangible device that canretain and store instructions for use by an instruction executiondevice. The computer readable storage medium may be, for example, but isnot limited to, an electronic storage device, a magnetic storage device,an optical storage device, an electromagnetic storage device, asemiconductor storage device, or any suitable combination of theforegoing. A non-exhaustive list of more specific examples of thecomputer readable storage medium includes the following: a portablecomputer diskette, a hard disk, a random access memory (RAM), aread-only memory (ROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROMor Flash memory), a static random access memory (SRAM), a portablecompact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM), a digital versatile disk (DVD),a memory stick, a floppy disk, a mechanically encoded device such aspunch-cards or raised structures in a groove having instructionsrecorded thereon, and any suitable combination of the foregoing. Acomputer readable storage medium, as used herein, is not to be construedas being transitory signals per se, such as radio waves or other freelypropagating electromagnetic waves, electromagnetic waves propagatingthrough a waveguide or other transmission media (e.g., light pulsespassing through a fiber-optic cable), or electrical signals transmittedthrough a wire.

Computer readable program instructions described herein can bedownloaded to respective computing/processing devices from a computerreadable storage medium or to an external computer or external storagedevice via a network, for example, the Internet, a local area network, awide area network and/or a wireless network. The network may comprisecopper transmission cables, optical transmission fibers, wirelesstransmission, routers, firewalls, switches, gateway computers and/oredge servers. A network adapter card or network interface in eachcomputing/processing device receives computer readable programinstructions from the network and forwards the computer readable programinstructions for storage in a computer readable storage medium withinthe respective computing/processing device.

Computer readable program instructions for carrying out operations ofthe present invention may be assembler instructions,instruction-set-architecture (ISA) instructions, machine instructions,machine dependent instructions, microcode, firmware instructions,state-setting data, configuration data for integrated circuitry, oreither source code or object code written in any combination of one ormore programming languages, including an object oriented programminglanguage such as Smalltalk, C++, or the like, and procedural programminglanguages, such as the “C” programming language or similar programminglanguages. The computer readable program instructions may executeentirely on the user's computer, partly on the user's computer, as astand-alone software package, partly on the user's computer and partlyon a remote computer or entirely on the remote computer or server. Inthe latter scenario, the remote computer may be connected to the user'scomputer through any type of network, including a local area network(LAN) or a wide area network (WAN), or the connection may be made to anexternal computer (for example, through the Internet using an InternetService Provider). In some embodiments, electronic circuitry including,for example, programmable logic circuitry, field-programmable gatearrays (FPGA), or programmable logic arrays (PLA) may execute thecomputer readable program instructions by utilizing state information ofthe computer readable program instructions to personalize the electroniccircuitry, in order to perform aspects of the present invention.

Aspects of the present invention are described herein with reference toflowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams of methods, apparatus(systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of theinvention. It will be understood that each block of the flowchartillustrations and/or block diagrams, and combinations of blocks in theflowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams, can be implemented bycomputer readable program instructions.

These computer readable program instructions may be provided to aprocessor of a general purpose computer, special purpose computer, orother programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, suchthat the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computeror other programmable data processing apparatus, create means forimplementing the functions/acts specified in the flowchart and/or blockdiagram block or blocks. These computer readable program instructionsmay also be stored in a computer readable storage medium that can directa computer, a programmable data processing apparatus, and/or otherdevices to function in a particular manner, such that the computerreadable storage medium having instructions stored therein comprises anarticle of manufacture including instructions which implement aspects ofthe function/act specified in the flowchart and/or block diagram blockor blocks.

The computer readable program instructions may also be loaded onto acomputer, other programmable data processing apparatus, or other deviceto cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer,other programmable apparatus or other device to produce a computerimplemented process, such that the instructions which execute on thecomputer, other programmable apparatus, or other device implement thefunctions/acts specified in the flowchart and/or block diagram block orblocks.

The flowchart and block diagrams in the Figures illustrate thearchitecture, functionality, and operation of possible implementationsof systems, methods, and computer program products according to variousembodiments of the present invention. In this regard, each block in theflowchart or block diagrams may represent a module, segment, or portionof instructions, which comprises one or more executable instructions forimplementing the specified logical function(s). In some alternativeimplementations, the functions noted in the block may occur out of theorder noted in the Figures. For example, two blocks shown in successionmay, in fact, be executed substantially concurrently, or the blocks maysometimes be executed in the reverse order, depending upon thefunctionality involved. It will also be noted that each block of theblock diagrams and/or flowchart illustration, and combinations of blocksin the block diagrams and/or flowchart illustration, can be implementedby special purpose hardware-based systems that perform the specifiedfunctions or acts or carry out combinations of special purpose hardwareand computer instructions.

In addition to the above, one or more aspects may be provided, offered,deployed, managed, serviced, etc. by a service provider who offersmanagement of customer environments. For instance, the service providercan create, maintain, support, etc. computer code and/or a computerinfrastructure that performs one or more aspects for one or morecustomers. In return, the service provider may receive payment from thecustomer under a subscription and/or fee agreement, as examples.Additionally or alternatively, the service provider may receive paymentfrom the sale of advertising content to one or more third parties.

In one aspect, an application may be deployed for performing one or moreembodiments. As one example, the deploying of an application comprisesproviding computer infrastructure operable to perform one or moreembodiments.

As a further aspect, a computing infrastructure may be deployedcomprising integrating computer readable code into a computing system,in which the code in combination with the computing system is capable ofperforming one or more embodiments.

As yet a further aspect, a process for integrating computinginfrastructure comprising integrating computer readable code into acomputer system may be provided. The computer system comprises acomputer readable medium, in which the computer medium comprises one ormore embodiments. The code in combination with the computer system iscapable of performing one or more embodiments.

Although various embodiments are described above, these are onlyexamples. For example, computing environments of other architectures canbe used to incorporate and use one or more embodiments. Further,different instructions, commands or operations may be used. Moreover,other security protocols, transmission protocols and/or standards may beemployed. Many variations are possible.

Further, other types of computing environments can benefit and be used.As an example, a data processing system suitable for storing and/orexecuting program code is usable that includes at least two processorscoupled directly or indirectly to memory elements through a system bus.The memory elements include, for instance, local memory employed duringactual execution of the program code, bulk storage, and cache memorywhich provide temporary storage of at least some program code in orderto reduce the number of times code must be retrieved from bulk storageduring execution.

Input/output or I/O devices (including, but not limited to, keyboards,displays, pointing devices, DASD, tape, CDs, DVDs, thumb drives andother memory media, etc.) can be coupled to the system either directlyor through intervening I/O controllers. Network adapters may also becoupled to the system to enable the data processing system to becomecoupled to other data processing systems or remote printers or storagedevices through intervening private or public networks. Modems, cablemodems, and Ethernet cards are just a few of the available types ofnetwork adapters.

The terminology used herein is for the purpose of describing particularembodiments only and is not intended to be limiting. As used herein, thesingular forms “a”, “an” and “the” are intended to include the pluralforms as well, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. It willbe further understood that the terms “comprises” and/or “comprising”,when used in this specification, specify the presence of statedfeatures, integers, steps, operations, elements, and/or components, butdo not preclude the presence or addition of one or more other features,integers, steps, operations, elements, components and/or groups thereof.

The corresponding structures, materials, acts, and equivalents of allmeans or step plus function elements in the claims below, if any, areintended to include any structure, material, or act for performing thefunction in combination with other claimed elements as specificallyclaimed. The description of one or more embodiments has been presentedfor purposes of illustration and description, but is not intended to beexhaustive or limited to in the form disclosed. Many modifications andvariations will be apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art. Theembodiment was chosen and described in order to best explain variousaspects and the practical application, and to enable others of ordinaryskill in the art to understand various embodiments with variousmodifications as are suited to the particular use contemplated.

What is claimed is:
 1. A computer program product for facilitatingprocessing in a computing environment, the computer program productcomprising: a computer readable storage medium readable by one or moreprocessing circuits and storing instructions for performing operationscomprising: initializing a local key manager (LKM) on a node of thecomputing environment, the node comprising a plurality of channels, andthe LKM configured to provide a secure data transfer between the nodeand an other node of the computing environment; establishing, by the LKMa connection between the LKM and an external key manager (EKM) thatstores a shared key for the node and the other node; and in response toestablishing the connection, registering, by the LKM, securitycapabilities of the plurality of channels, the security capabilitiesused by the LKM to provide the secure data transfer between the node andthe other node.
 2. The computer program product of claim 1, wherein thenode is a host computer and the LKM executes in a logical partition ofthe host computer.
 3. The computer program product of claim 1, whereinthe providing the secure data transfer comprises managing private keysfor at least a subset of the plurality of channels.
 4. The computerprogram product of claim 1, wherein the establishing a connectioncomprises initiating a request to the EKM for the connection, therequest comprising an authentication certificate assigned to the node.5. The computer program product of claim 4, wherein the connection isestablished based at least in response to the EKM recognizing theauthentication certificate.
 6. The computer program product of claim 4,wherein the request is a key management interoperability protocol (KMIP)message that is sent via a transport layer security (TLS) session to theEKM
 7. The computer program product of claim 1, wherein the node is ahost computer or a storage array.
 8. The computer program product ofclaim 1, wherein the other node is a host computer or a storage array.9. The computer program product of claim 1, wherein the channel is ahost bus adapter (HBA).
 10. The computer program product of claim 1,wherein the LKM is further configured to provide a secure data transferbetween two of the plurality of channels on the node.
 11. Acomputer-implemented method of facilitating processing within acomputing environment, the computer-implemented method comprising:initializing a local key manager (LKM) on a node of the computingenvironment, the node comprising a plurality of channels, and the LKMconfigured to provide a secure data transfer between the node and another node of the computing environment; establishing, by the LKM aconnection between the LKM and an external key manager (EKM) that storesa shared key for the node and the other node; and in response toestablishing the connection, registering, by the LKM, securitycapabilities of the plurality of channels, the security capabilitiesused by the LKM to provide the secure data transfer between the node andthe other node.
 12. The computer-implemented method of claim 11, whereinthe node is a host computer and the LKM executes in a logical partitionof the host computer.
 13. The computer-implemented method of claim 11,wherein the providing the secure data transfer comprises managingprivate keys for at least a subset of the plurality of channels.
 14. Thecomputer-implemented method of claim 11, wherein the establishing aconnection comprises initiating a request to the EKM for the connection,the request comprising an authentication certificate assigned to thenode.
 15. The computer-implemented method of claim 14, wherein therequest is a key management interoperability protocol (KMIP) messagethat is sent via a transport layer security (TLS) session to the EKM 16.The computer-implemented method of claim 11, wherein the node is a hostcomputer or a storage array.
 17. The computer-implemented method ofclaim 11, wherein the channel is a host bus adapter (HBA).
 18. Acomputer system for facilitating processing within a computingenvironment, the computer system comprising: a node; and a plurality ofchannels coupled to the node, wherein the computer system is configuredto perform operations comprising: initializing a local key manager (LKM)on the node, the node comprising a plurality of channels, and the LKMconfigured to provide a secure data transfer between the node and another node; establishing, by the LKM a connection between the LKM and anexternal key manager (EKM) that stores a shared key for the node and theother node; and in response to establishing the connection, registering,by the LKM, security capabilities of the plurality of channels, thesecurity capabilities used by the LKM to provide the secure datatransfer between the node and the other node.
 19. The computer system ofclaim 18, wherein the node is a host computer and the LKM executes in alogical partition of the host computer.
 20. The computer system of claim18, wherein the establishing a connection comprises initiating a requestto the EKM for the connection, the request comprising an authenticationcertificate assigned to the node.